对数据中心的抵制或许本质只是电力问题
上周,当全美选民前往投票站投票时,我正在弗吉尼亚州的阿什本(Ashburn),这里属于被称为“数据中心走廊”(Data Center Alley)的区域——全球最大的数据中心枢纽。也可以说,如今席卷全美的反弹情绪,最早就是在这里开始成形的。
开车穿行其间有种超现实的感觉。混凝土浇筑的巨型建筑在每条主干道旁耸立,名字如 Skybox、CloudHQ。
在大型科技公司内部,一个被普遍接受的看法是:针对数据中心的这场“战争”,其根源必然不只是数据中心本身。中期选举两天后,OpenAI 全球事务首席官 Chris Lehane 写道,数据中心“已成为公众对可负担性、企业权力以及人们对自己未来失去掌控感的不安情绪的替身”。换句话说,这是一场文化战争。
但在数据中心走廊待了几天后,我开始怀疑,事情是否真如 Lehane 所描述的那样是一种“替身”。离开时我确信,针对数据中心的反弹,其核心更多在于电力,而非大型科技公司所承认的那样。这个行业可以改善自身形象,但无法逃避其对电力巨大胃口所带来的现实后果。
原因如下。为 AI 公司想要的那种数据中心供电有两种方式:接入电网,或就地自发电。在弗吉尼亚州劳登县(Loudoun County),数据中心无处不在,但建设节奏比美国其他地方眼下正在进行的狂飙式扩张更为平稳,这里大多数数据中心都接入现有电网。
我走进的一座由 Equinix 运营的设施,现场配有大型柴油发电机作为备用,但电力来自当地公用事业公司 Dominion Energy。Dominion 的电力很大一部分由天然气发电(比煤炭或石油更清洁,但不如可再生能源)。
如今在弗吉尼亚州这一地区运营的数据中心,平均电力容量为54兆瓦。这比丹佛国际机场的功耗还要高。
埃琳娜·施洛斯伯格(Elena Schlossberg)是弗吉尼亚州一位知名的反数据中心活动人士。她告诉我,每当行业把这场争斗描绘成一场文化战争时,她“总是拿头撞墙”。她说:“这从来都是关于电力的问题”——也就是电。
公平地说,弗吉尼亚州的一些抗议者似乎比施洛斯伯格更受一种更广泛的反科技民粹主义情绪所驱动。但真正在很大程度上塑造了这场反弹走向的,是从电网抽取如此之多电力所带来的特定后果。
近期的抗议促使该州出台了新规:数据中心必须全额承担新建电网输电线路的成本,并确保这些成本不会分摊到其他所有人头上。数据中心开发商告诉我,他们正在为新一轮规则做准备,这些规则将在用电高峰期切断它们的电网供电。施洛斯伯格还担心电网承压带来的连锁影响——例如,数据中心会更多地使用柴油发电机,或者 Dominion Energy 为满足需求会扩大化石燃料投入而非可再生能源。
美国其他地方正在建设的人工智能数据中心,绝大多数都不是这样设计的。它们想要的规模实在太大,以至于企业纷纷在几乎没有任何电网基础设施可接入的农村地区落地。在那里建厂意味着要自带电力(即所谓的“表后”电力),形式是天然气驱动的涡轮机。企业还会建柴油发电机作为备用。例如,据报道 Anthropic 已同意斥资34亿美元购买燃气轮机,据称这是人工智能公司规模最大的一笔发电设备采购。
即便电网就在附近,也未必能提供所需的电量。对 AI 训练有吸引力的最小数据中心为 300 兆瓦。对单个工业场地来说这已是用电大户,但并非没有先例:一位数据中心开发商告诉我,他正在关注一家旧钢厂,该厂址本就具备从电网取用这么大电量的条件。
但理想设施的规模更接近 6,000 兆瓦。这大约相当于芝加哥全市的用电量,而仅芝加哥市内就有 20 多座发电厂为其供电(更远处还有数十座)。
乍看之下,数据中心企业自建发电设施的想法颇具吸引力,因为它们不会给电网造成压力。但在这种规模上发电不可避免地会影响周边社区,而以往当公共事业单位建设如此体量的基础设施时,社区通常都期望对选址拥有发言权。如今,私营企业正在推进同等规模的项目。
任何规模的天燃气轮机都会排放空气污染物。若使用柴油发电机,情况更糟。而在这种前所未有的抢建潮中,企业成了糟糕的邻居(还记得吗,据美国环境保护署称,埃隆·马斯克在孟菲斯为一座数据中心架设数十台燃机供电时违反了空气质量法规)。
大型科技公司倾向于将这种反弹归咎于文化战争,这掩盖了一个简单的事实:一座由计算机组成的小城市,你无论怎样做,都不可能让周边住得多舒服。诚然,企业可以争取更优厚的条件,从而提高税收、雇用本地员工、加大社区参与——抗议正促使它们这么做。但如果要求一个小镇同时接纳一座迪士尼世界、一座国际机场、一座钢厂,以及为它们供电的发电厂,我们还会对它的惶恐感到意外吗?
再说一次,这并不是说这就是反对数据中心的唯一原因。对失业的担忧、对生存性风险的担忧,以及对权力向企业集中的担忧,都在助推这股反弹,错误信息也不例外(大多数设施的用水量远低于许多人的想象)。消耗大量电力本身也并不必然是坏事:许多改善现代生活的进步恰恰需要如此。
但正如一位开发商最近告诉我的,业内人士认为,制约他们雄心的与其说是公众反对,不如说是电力不足。这一点值得我们注意。
那么接下来会发生什么?新当选政客在数据中心问题上的实际立场,可能不会像他们竞选时那样负面。但无论如何,有一点似乎都成立:如果新建数据中心需要自行现场发电,它们就会去那些最没有能力抵抗的人所在的地方。这或许意味着二叠纪盆地(Permian Basin),那里的天然气管网便于开发商接入,且人口稀少。企业也可能到海外碰碰运气;事实上,Google 在选举次日就宣布,将在马来西亚的数据中心项目上投入 150 亿美元。
但有一个领域,大型科技公司可能几乎完全不受限制——正如 Elon Musk 在中期选举结果陆续出炉仅数小时后发帖所言:“现在,太空中的数据中心看起来相当有吸引力。”
译文由英文原文机器翻译,术语按行业惯例统一,可在文末展开原文核对。
查看英文原文(The backlash about data centers might really just be about electricity)
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As voters went to the polls across the US last week, I was in Ashburn, Virginia, part of what’s known as Data Center Alley—the world’s largest data center hub. It’s also where the backlash now sweeping the country arguably first began taking shape.
Driving through it is surreal. Concrete monolithic buildings loom along every major road, with names like Skybox and CloudHQ.
It’s accepted wisdom in Big Tech that the war against data centers must be about something bigger than just data centers themselves. Two days after the midterms, OpenAI’s chief global affairs officer, Chris Lehane, wrote that data centers “have become a proxy for public unease about affordability, corporate power, and people losing control over their futures.” It’s a culture war, in other words.
But spending a few days in Data Center Alley left me wondering if it’s really the proxy that Lehane describes. I came away convinced that the data center backlash is more about electricity than Big Tech admits. The industry can improve its image, but it can’t escape the physical consequences of its enormous appetite for electricity.
Here’s why. There are two ways to power the sort of data center that AI companies want: connecting to the grid, or generating electricity onsite. In Virginia’s Loudoun County, where data centers are ubiquitous but have been built at a steadier pace than the breakneck expansion now underway elsewhere in the country, most are connected to the existing grid.
One facility I went inside, operated by Equinix, has massive diesel generators onsite for backup but gets its power from the local utility, Dominion Energy. Much of Dominion’s electricity is generated by natural gas (which is cleaner than coal or oil, but worse than renewables).
The average data center operating in this part of Virginia today has a power capacity of 54 megawatts. That’s more than the power draw of the Denver International Airport.
Elena Schlossberg, a prominent activist against data centers in Virginia, told me she’s “always banging my head against the wall” when the industry paints the fight as a culture war. “It was always about power,” she says—that is, electricity.
Some Virginia protesters appear more animated by a broader anti-tech populism than Schlossberg, to be fair. But it’s the particular consequences of drawing so much power from the grid that have done the most to shape how the backlash has played out.
Recent protests have led to new rules from the state that data centers must pay fully for the cost of new transmission lines to the grid and make sure they’re not spread among everyone else. Data center developers told me they’re preparing for new rules that would cut them off from grid power during peak demand. Schlossberg also worries about the downstream effects of a strained grid—for example, that data centers will run more diesel generators or that Dominion Energy will expand fossil fuel inputs rather than renewables to meet demand.
The overwhelming majority of AI data centers being built elsewhere in the country are not designed this way. The scale desired is so massive that companies are setting up in rural areas where there is virtually no grid infrastructure to connect to. Building there means bringing your own power (so-called “behind the meter” power), in the form of natural-gas-powered turbines. Companies also build diesel generators for backup. Anthropic, for example, has reportedly agreed to pay $3.4 billion for gas turbines in what’s described as the largest power generation purchase by an AI company.
Even if grids were nearby, they’d be unlikely to serve the amount of power demanded. The smallest data centers attractive for AI training are 300 megawatts. It’s a lot of power for one industrial site, but not unprecedented: One data center developer told me he’s eyeing a former steel mill already equipped to draw that much electricity from the grid.
But the ideal facilities are more like 6,000 megawatts. That’s the estimated draw of the city of Chicago, which is powered by more than 20 power plants within the city alone (and dozens farther out).
The notion of data center companies’ bringing their own power might seem attractive at first, because they wouldn’t be straining the grid. But generating electricity at this scale inevitably affects surrounding communities, and when public utilities build infrastructure of this magnitude, communities have traditionally expected a say in where it goes. Now, private companies are undertaking projects on a similar scale.
Natural-gas turbines of any scale release air pollutants. When diesel generators are used, it’s even worse. And in the unprecedented rush to get these facilities operating, companies have become horrible neighbors (recall that Elon Musk violated air quality laws when he set up dozens of turbines to power a data center in Memphis, according to the Environmental Protection Agency).
Big Tech’s tendency to chalk the backlash up to a culture war obfuscates one simple fact: There’s only so pleasant you can make a small city of computers to live around. Sure, companies can pursue better deals that raise tax revenues, hire local workers, and get more community involvement, as the protests are leading them to do. But if a small town is asked to welcome a Walt Disney World, an international airport, a steel plant, and the power plants to run them all, should we be surprised by its trepidation?
Again, that’s not to say this is the sole reason for opposition to data centers. Fears of job losses, existential risks, and concentrated corporate power all fuel the backlash, as does misinformation (most facilities use far less water than many people think). Nor is consuming enormous amounts of electricity inherently bad: Many of the advances that have improved modern life have required just that.
But as one developer recently told me, industry insiders see their ambitions as constrained less by public opposition than by a lack of electricity. That should tell us something.
So what happens next? It’s possible that newly elected politicians’ actual stances on data centers won’t be as negative as the ones they campaigned on. But what seems true regardless is that if new data centers need their own power generated onsite, they’ll go where there are the fewest people able to resist them. That might mean the Permian Basin, where a network of natural-gas lines can be easy for developers to connect to and populations are sparse. Companies might also try their chances abroad; Google, in fact, announced the day after the elections that it will spend $15 billion on data center projects in Malaysia.
But there’s one place where Big Tech may find virtually no limits at all, as Elon Musk posted just hours after the midterms results came rolling in: “Data centers in space looking pretty appealing right now.”
正文保留英文原文,标题与摘要由机器翻译。
原文发布于 MIT Technology Review(The backlash about data centers might really just be about electricity),标题、摘要与正文由机器翻译,术语按行业惯例统一,未经人工逐句校订。