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为 AI 芯片打造“查找我的”的竞赛

算力 来源:IEEE Spectrum Semiconductors 2026-11-09 21:00 0 阅读 机器翻译
为 AI 芯片打造“查找我的”的竞赛

Find My AI 芯片:美国计划在海外追踪 GPU - IEEE Spectrum

为 AI 芯片打造“Find My”的竞赛

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为 AI 芯片打造“查找我的”功能之争

位置验证可能有助于遏制芯片走私和非法转运

Rina Diane Caballar 是特约编辑,报道科技及其与科学、社会和环境的交叉领域。

Nicole Millman;图片来源:iStock

为限制中国的人工智能能力,美国于 2022 年对向中国出口某些先进芯片实施了限制。但在整个 AI 热潮中,这些芯片仍然不断在中国出现。

2026 年 10 月 1 日,美国逮捕了一名男子,其被控利用原本用于发往马来西亚和新加坡的报关文件,向中国运送了价值超过 3 亿美元的搭载 GPU 的服务器。随着芯片走私和非法转运持续发生,美国正逐渐认识到:越想限制其 AI 芯片的流向,就越难精确定位它们。

为帮助遏制这一问题,美国正转向位置验证。去年 3 月,美国众议院外交事务委员会通过了一项法案,要求对先进 AI 芯片进行位置验证。在 9 月下旬美中峰会之前,议员们呼吁就该法案及相关法案进行全院表决。

如果这类要求获得通过,芯片制造商将如何遵守?它们可以构建防篡改的信任根硬件,实施加密签名与传输,甚至可能为单颗芯片建立指纹。类似于用于追踪 Apple 设备的“查找”功能,以下是设计 AI 芯片版“查找”功能的几种可能方案。

精准定位的“ping”信号

位置验证可以采取多种形式,例如地理定位机制、库存管理工具、邮寄检查以及视频检查。一份于9月由安全与新兴技术中心(CSET)发布的关于芯片位置追踪的报告的作者表示,将多种方法结合起来——例如以基于 ping 的位置验证(PLV)为主、辅以实地检查——将是一种可行且稳健的做法。

为了推断 AI 芯片的位置,PLV 会测量 ping 从芯片发出、抵达全球多个可信“地标”服务器并返回所需的时间。CSET 高级研究分析师、该报告合著者 Kyle Miller 表示,对于新的 AI 芯片,制造商可以将 PLV 功能集成到硬件本身之中,而对于已在流通中的芯片,则可通过固件更新来应用这一功能。

研究人员指出,并非所有 AI 芯片都应被追踪。“优先对象应是最高端的数据中心芯片——即高端数据中心 GPU 中的精品,”CSET 高级数据研究分析师、该报告合著者 Jacob Feldgoise 表示。

一项类似的举措涉及传输加密的“主权证书”。根据安全计算公司 Lucid Computing 发布的规范草案,这些证书充当“加密凭证,可在特定时间点提供计算设备(如 CPU 或 GPU)物理位置的可验证、不可伪造的证明”。

“如果你能使用存在于某块特定芯片上的私钥,用这把密码学密钥对一条消息签名,然后让一条所谓的‘地标服务器’接收这条消息,那么你就可以发送几条这样的消息,并测量这些消息的往返时间。许多现代芯片都带有可信执行环境,支持硬件信任根,你可以借此对这些消息签名,”Lucid Computing 首席执行官兼联合创始人 Kristian Rönn 说。“这样你就能得出该芯片所处位置的一个半径范围。”

Miller 说,PLV 可能会对芯片走私者产生一定威慑。“他们知道,一旦把这块芯片开机,它就会开始向这些地标服务器发送 ping 信号。这可能会遏制一部分走私行为。”他还补充说,当系统标记某块芯片位于非预期位置时,“PLV 数据能让你更好地判断它是在何时、何处被转移的。”

然而,基于 ping 的位置验证只能在芯片被转移之后才发现问题。它无法追踪仍处于库存中、运输途中或尚未激活的离线芯片。而且当一块芯片未响应 ping 请求时,系统也无从判断这是因为合理原因,还是出于恶意目的。

这正是实地检查发挥作用的地方。“你需要开展后续调查工作。你需要亲自前往这些数据中心,进行实地审计。本质上,[PLV] 会生成线索,而你去追查这些线索,”Miller 说。

PLV 系统的工作方式是:由芯片向可信服务器发送信号并接收来自可信服务器的信号,并测量往返时间。图片来源:CSET

数据中心的“测谎仪”

尽管围绕基于 ping 的位置验证设有防护措施,这套方法仍容易受到特定攻击的影响。例如,如果对手获得了对芯片的物理接触权限,他们就能阻止芯片发送信号,或者提取出密钥并在目标位置伪造信号。

为应对这一问题,一些安全研究人员正在探索用硬件指纹取代密钥。一项研究展示了一个概念验证性质的 GPU 指纹生成功能,它基于 NVIDIA H200 GPU 各自的制造差异,并以随机数作为种子,为每块 GPU 生成唯一的指纹。

“你需要支持其他类型的指纹识别,因为并非所有芯片都有硬件信任根。你可能想用某种统计指纹来确认这颗芯片确实是它所声称的那一颗,”Rönn 说。“这还要求芯片周围具备良好的物理安全措施,比如防篡改。随着时间推移,理想情况下你会希望拥有更多层的纵深防御。”

此外,CSET 的报告警告称,PLV 成本高昂。而如果中国具备了自行制造先进 AI 芯片的能力,“那么追踪美国芯片的出口就不再是那么重要的战略优先事项了,”Miller 说。

CSET 高级研究分析师、该报告合著者 Hanna Dohmen 指出了美国出口管制制度中的其他漏洞。“目前,中国企业在法律上可以通过云服务提供商远程访问境外的 AI 芯片,”她说。这些先进的 AI 芯片可能被部署在马来西亚等东南亚国家的数据中心里,而这些数据中心正越来越多地服务于中国企业。

无论面向 AI 芯片的“Find My”是否会成为一项监管要求,Feldgoise 都预计先进 AI 芯片的出口条件将更加严格。“这是因为算力对国家和经济安全的重要性日益上升,”他说。“产生算力的芯片正被视为一种战略资源,因此,如果随着时间推移,对这些设备的尽职调查要求有所增加,我不会感到意外。”

Rönn 认为主权证书在未来将成为必不可少的工具,并将其比作数据中心的“测谎仪”,它能回答“在哪里、如何、什么以及谁”的问题,让我们知道这些数据中心在 AI 系统方面符合基本安全标准。

译文由英文原文机器翻译,术语按行业惯例统一,可在文末展开原文核对。

查看英文原文(The Race to Build a “Find My” for AI Chips)

Find My AI Chips: the US Plans to Track GPUs Abroad - IEEE Spectrum

The Race to Build a “Find My” for AI Chips

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The Race to Build a “Find My” for AI Chips

Location verification could help deter chip smuggling and diversion

Rina Diane Caballar is a contributing editor covering tech and its intersections with science, society, and the environment.

Conceptual illustration of a radar scanning a large computer chip, with pieces of the chip featuring different regions of the United States of America and China on them.

Nicole Millman; Source images: iStock

In a bid to limit China’s AI capabilities, the United States imposed restrictions in 2022 on the export of certain advanced chips to China. But throughout the AI boom those chips have kept turning up in China anyway.

On 1 October 2026, the U.S. arrested a man on charges of sending over $300 million worth of GPU-equipped servers to China using paperwork intended for shipments to Malaysia and Singapore. As chip smuggling and diversion continues, the United States is learning that the more it tries to limit the motion of its AI chips, the harder they are to precisely locate.

To help curb the issue, the country is turning to location verification. Last March, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee passed a bill requiring location verification for advanced AI chips. Ahead of the U.S.-China summit in late September, legislators called for a floor vote on that and related bills.

If such a requirement were to pass, how would chipmakers comply? They could build tamper-proof root of trust hardware, implement cryptographic signing and transmission, or possibly even fingerprint individual chips. Akin to the “Find My” feature for keeping track of Apple devices, here are some possibilities for designing a “Find My” for AI chips.

Pings that pinpoint positions

Location verification can take different forms, such as geolocation mechanisms, inventory management tools, mail-in inspections, and video inspections. A combination of approaches, such as ping-based location verification (PLV) supplemented by physical inspections, would be a feasible and robust approach, say the authors of a September Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET)report on chip location tracking.

To deduce an AI chip’s location, PLV measures the time it takes for a ping to travel from the chip to multiple trusted “landmark” servers around the world and back. Kyle Miller, a senior research analyst at CSET and coauthor of the report, says that for new AI chips, manufacturers could integrate PLV functionality into the hardware itself, while a firmware update could be applied to chips already in circulation.

Not all AI chips should be tracked, the researchers note. “The priority should be for the highest-end data center chips—the cream of the crop in high-end data center GPUs,” says Jacob Feldgoise, a senior data research analyst at CSET and coauthor of the report.

A similar initiative involves transmitting encrypted “sovereignty certificates.” These certificates act as “cryptographic credentials that provide verifiable, unforgeable proof of the physical location of a computing device, such as a CPU or GPU, at a specific point in time,” per the draft specification published by secure computing firm Lucid Computing.

“If you can use a private key that exists on a particular chip, and you can sign a message with that cryptographic key, and then that message is received by a so-called landmark server, then you can send a couple of those messages and time those messages. A lot of modern chips come with trusted execution environments that support a hardware root of trust where you can sign these messages,” says Kristian Rönn, CEO and cofounder of Lucid Computing. “You get a radius of where the chip has to be.”

PLV could have some effect on chip smugglers, Miller says. “They know if they turn this chip on, it’s going to start pinging these landmark servers. That could deter some smuggling.” And when the system flags a chip as residing in a nonintended location, “the PLV data gives you a better sense of when and where it was moved,” he adds.

However, ping-based location verification can only uncover diversion after it has happened. It can’t track offline chips that are in storage, in transit, or have yet to be activated. And when a chip fails to respond to a ping request, the system won’t know whether it’s due to a valid reason or nefarious causes.

This is where physical inspections come in. “You need to do that follow-on investigative work. You need to physically go to these data centers and do those physical audits as well. Essentially, [PLV] generates leads, and you track down those leads,” says Miller.

Illustrated steps of a location verification system. The process involves communication between configured AI chips and landmark servers, as well as central reporting servers that aggregate timing data.A PLV system involves sending signals from a chip to and from trusted servers and measuring the travel time.Source image: CSET

A “lie detector” for data centers

Despite the safeguards around ping-based location verification, the methodology remains vulnerable to particular attacks. If adversaries gain physical access to a chip, for example, they could prevent it from sending signals, or they could extract cryptographic keys and spoof a signal from the intended location.

To fight that, some security researchers are exploring hardware fingerprints instead of cryptographic keys. One study demonstrated a proof-of-concept GPU fingerprinting function that produced unique fingerprints for Nvidia H200 GPUs based on their manufacturing variations and random numbers as seeds.

“You want to support other types of fingerprinting because not all chips have a hardware root of trust. You might want to use some statistical fingerprinting to know that the chip is what it’s supposed to be,” Rönn says. “It also requires good physical security around the chips, such as tamper-proofing. Over time, you ideally want to have more defense in depth.”

Additionally, the CSET report warns that PLV is costly. And if China achieves the ability to craft its own advanced AI chips, “then tracking the export of U.S. chips is less of a strategic priority,” says Miller.

Hanna Dohmen, a senior research analyst at CSET and coauthor of the report, points to other gaps in the U.S. export control regime. “Currently, Chinese companies are legally able to remotely access AI chips abroad through cloud service providers,” she says. These advanced AI chips might be installed in data centers across Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia, which are increasingly serving Chinese firms.

Whether or not a “Find My” for AI chips becomes a regulatory requirement, Feldgoise envisions tighter conditions for the export of advanced AI chips. “This is based on the increasing importance of compute to national and economic security,” he says. “The chips that generate compute are being seen as a strategic resource, so I would be unsurprised if the due diligence requirements on these devices increase as time passes.”

Rönn views sovereignty certificates as essential tools in the future, likening it to a “lie detector” for data centers that answer the “where, how, what, and who questions for us to know that they comply with a basic standard of security when it comes to AI systems.”

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原文为英文,正文由自动抓取并保留原文。

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原文发布于 IEEE Spectrum Semiconductors(The Race to Build a “Find My” for AI Chips),标题、摘要与正文由机器翻译,术语按行业惯例统一,未经人工逐句校订。

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