研究:全球AI供应链三分之一处于政府视野之外

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研究发现:全球 AI 供应链的三分之一对政府而言处于“隐形”状态
由 Gaby Clark 编辑,Robert Egan 审校
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剑桥大学的一份新报告显示,全球 AI 供应链中多达三分之一的环节未受到任何国家和国际政策制定与监管的关注,这一庞大的“隐形地带”就位于全球 AI 生产体系的中间位置。
剑桥大学的一个研究团队在 14 个供应链层级中发现了脆弱点,其中有 137 个要素在 50 多个国家生产或汇集。许多关键的“卡点”并不位于中国和美国这两个 AI 强国境内。
“美国和中国是 AI 叙事的核心,但这项研究让我们看到,AI 技术栈中的关键技术 and 材料,其依赖关系远远超出两国国界,”AI 与地缘政治项目主任 Verity Harding 表示。“这说明没有任何一个国家能够单独控制 AI 供应链。”
报告显示,一家日本企业在 AI 芯片所需的一种材料上占据 95% 的市场份额。即便是那些众所周知的“卡点”,也同样依赖其他国家:主导 EUV 光刻的荷兰企业(ASML)依赖由德国和美国公司掌控的关键部件。
事实上,这项研究显示,日本、德国以及从比利时到韩国等一些所谓的中等强国,对全球 AI 生产的影响力远超它们本国政府的认知。
政策忽视了供应链影响力
研究人员描述了一种“意想不到的错配”:一个国家最上层的 AI 政策文件与其在供应链中的实际位置并不一致,并将其称为“普遍现象”。
第一作者 Siyi Liu 博士表示:“大多数政策讨论把人工智能简化为算力、数据和模型等少数几项投入。这并不足以准确理解 AI 供应链的复杂性。”
她补充说:“许多政府并未意识到,自己在全球 AI 供应链的核心位置上既握有优势,也存在脆弱之处。理解这一点,将是在 AI 治理中建立可信谈判筹码的基础。”
研究人员识别出 137 个供应链环节,英国参与其中 41 个,但其 AI 政策仅提及 3 个,忽视了英国在芯片设计和工业气体方面的专长。日本在供应链位置上的排名仅次于美国,但其 AI 政策文件仅认可 3 个。
剑桥大学的研究人员分析了来自 43 个国家和地区、欧盟以及 OECD 的 117 份 AI 相关政策文件,发现这些文件都紧盯模型和数据中心,以及资金和治理,而对 AI 供应链至关重要的工厂、化学品、芯片设计软件和封装技术则被完全忽视。
这些“上游”组件中任何一个环节受到干扰,都可能引发多米诺骨牌效应,导致 AI 供应短缺,进而可能动摇全球股市、投资和生产力。
剑桥大学贝内特公共政策学院 AI 与地缘政治项目(AIxGEO)的专家表示,完全的“AI 主权”——即一个国家自主运营本国 AI 供应链,这是许多国家暗示自己想要追求的目标——是“不可能”的。
研究团队为各国政府开发了一套工具包,用于审视自身在这一链条中的位置。他们表示,这将帮助政策制定者了解应在何处、何时在 AI 要素供应方之间实现多元化,自己依赖的是谁,以及何时应彻底“退出”外部供应商并建设本国能力。
绘制全球生产链图谱
在最新研究中,AIxGEO 团队全面绘制了全球 AI 供应链图谱,揭示出 14 个不同的层级,从半导体所需的原始矿物和超纯气体,到晶圆、芯片和服务器,最终到训练完成的模型。贯穿各层的还包括治理标准和航运路线。
进一步拆解后,研究人员识别出 137 个具体的“要素”,例如镓或超大规模云平台,并进一步细分为 351 个“子要素”:即决定谁有资格供应的技术规格。已识别的近 800 家企业分布在 56 个国家和地区,占据着供应链中的位置。
Liu 表示:“各国政府在与盟友合作、结合各自优势构建集体行动能力时,需要务实。”
AI 硬件背后的盲区
然而,该团队对数十个国家以及政府间组织的 AI 政策与监管文件的分析显示,在被识别出的供应链环节中,有略高于 33% 的环节完全没有被提及。
这种“不可见性”大多集中在供应链的“物理中段”。这包括芯片设计、封装与芯片测试,以及“算力”背后的一些硬件和软件,例如制造 AI 服务器和“商用加速器”(让企业得以采用 AI 的平台)。
报告重点提到的一个隐藏卡点实例,是用于设计 AI 芯片的 EDA(电子设计自动化)软件。它对 NVIDIA、AMD 和 Google 这类公司至关重要。
这款软件由美国的三家公司主导——Synopsys、Cadence 和 Siemens EDA——却几乎得不到政策关注,这与芯片和大语言模型不同:没有它,后者根本不会存在。
另一个主要的“盲区”是先进封装:将多颗半导体芯片连接成高性能 AI 处理器,这对前沿模型至关重要。这一封装环节绝大多数集中在台湾、越南和菲律宾等亚洲国家和地区。
“政策制定者关注的是成品芯片,而不是其背后的生态系统。他们盯着 GPU,却忽视了把这些芯片变成可用 AI 硬件所必需的封装环节,”Liu 表示。
日本被忽视的制造实力
日本成为全球最被低估的 AI 强国,其供应链位置数量位居第二,正好排在中国之前。报告显示,有 101 家日本企业在从硅晶圆到半导体测试的 69 个环节中占据位置。然而,日本自身的政策文件中仅提及其中三个环节。
研究人员指出,日本公司味之素(Ajinomoto)控制着全球超过 95% 的积层膜(build-up film)供应,这是先进 AI 芯片制造所需的一种绝缘材料。
“日本的优势来自设备,没有设备就无法生产硬件,”Liu 表示。“供应链是环环相扣的,因此这种涓滴效应可能会影响到顶级前沿模型的计算能力。”
超越 AI 超级大国的筹码
英国几乎没有与 AI 相关的制造业,但通过剑桥公司 Arm(尽管其多数股权由日本软银持有)在芯片设计 IP 领域握有筹码。它是研究与专业知识的基地,尤其在 AI 安全方面,并拥有宝贵的健康与基因组数据集。
报告着重指出,英国在供应链中拥有立足点、却在受审视的英国政策中被忽略的环节,例如芯片设计,以及通过全球最大工业气体公司之一林德(Linde)为半导体工厂提供所需纯气体的能力。
一些影响力超出自身认知的小国包括比利时,该国在半导体化学品回收方面实力雄厚,并拥有大型纳米电子研发中心校际微电子研究中心(imec)。
爱尔兰在生产供应链上没有位置,但它可以通过能源和规划影响 AI 产能,因为它为 Google 和 AMD 等美国大型科技公司提供了欧洲基地,使其成为“东道国与基础设施国家”。卡塔尔生产全球大部分氦气——一种至关重要的供应链原材料,同时也是潜在的巨大 AI 投资方。
今年早些时候,Nvidia 前 CEO 黄仁勋将 AI 供应链描述为“五层蛋糕”(能源、芯片、基础设施、模型和应用)。
哈丁补充道:“AI 供应链远比某些简化叙事所描述的要复杂得多,对其的掌控权也分散得多。许多政府手中的牌比它们意识到的更多。”
《看不见的 AI 供应链》,DOI: 10.17863/CAM.136717
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引用:研究发现全球 AI 供应链的三分之一对政府而言“不可见”(2026 年 11 月 17 日),2026 年 11 月 17 日检索自 https://techxplore.com/news/2026-11-global-ai-chain-invisible.html
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A third of the global AI supply chain is 'invisible' to governments, study finds
edited by Gaby Clark, reviewed by Robert Egan
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As much as a third of the AI supply chain receives no attention from national and international policymaking and regulation, according to a new Cambridge report that reveals a vast "zone of invisibility" in the middle of global AI production.
A University of Cambridge team found vulnerabilities across 14 supply-chain layers, with 137 elements produced or convened in over 50 countries. Many critical "chokepoints" sit outside the AI powerhouses of China and the U.S.
"The U.S. and China are central to the AI story, but this research shows us the extent to which critical technologies and materials across the AI stack have dependencies that extend far beyond their borders," said Verity Harding, director of the AI and Geopolitics project. "It shows that no one country can control the AI supply chain alone."
One Japanese firm has a 95% market share of a material needed for AI chips, the report shows. Even notorious chokepoints depend on other nations: the Dutch firm dominating EUV lithography (ASML) relies on essential parts controlled by German and U.S. companies.
In fact, the study suggests that countries such as Japan, Germany and some so-called middle powers—from Belgium to South Korea—have far more leverage over global AI production than even their own governments realize.
Policy overlooks supply-chain leverage
Researchers describe an "unexpected mismatch" between a nation's top AI policy documents and its actual positions in the supply chain, calling it a "universal pattern."
"Most policy discussions reduce artificial intelligence to just a few inputs, such as compute, data and models. This is not an accurate understanding of the complexity of the AI supply chain," said lead author Dr. Siyi Liu.
"Many governments are unaware of the strengths and vulnerabilities they hold at the heart of the global AI supply chain. Understanding this will be the basis of credible bargaining power in AI governance," she added.
The U.K. is involved in 41 of the 137 supply-chain elements researchers identify, yet its AI policies name just three, ignoring U.K. specialties in chip design and industrial gases. Japan is second only to the U.S. in terms of supply-chain positions, yet its AI policy documents recognize only three.
Cambridge researchers analyzed 117 AI-related policy documents from 43 countries and territories, the EU and OECD, and found a fixation on models and data centers, as well as funding and governance, while the factories, chemicals, chip-design software and packaging technologies vital to the AI supply chain are completely overlooked.
Disruption to any one of these "upstream" components could trigger a domino effect that leads to AI supply shortages, potentially destabilizing stock markets, investment and productivity around the world.
Experts from the AI & Geopolitics Project (AIxGEO) at Cambridge's Bennett School of Public Policy say that total "AI sovereignty," a nation autonomously operating its own AI supply chain—a goal many nations hint at pursuing—is "impossible."
The research team created a toolkit for governments to audit their place in the chain. They say it will help policymakers understand where and when to diversify across AI element providers, who they depend on, or when to "exit" entirely from an outside supplier and build national capacity.
Mapping the global production chain
For the latest study, the AIxGEO team comprehensively mapped the global AI supply chain to reveal 14 distinct layers, from the raw minerals and the ultra-pure gases needed for semiconductors, to the wafers, chips and servers, and eventually the trained models. Cross-cutting layers include governance standards and shipping routes.
Breaking it down, researchers identified 137 specific "elements," such as gallium or hyperscale cloud platforms, with a further 351 "sub-elements": tech specs that determine who can supply it. Nearly 800 firms identified hold supply-chain positions across 56 countries and territories.
"Governments need to be pragmatic in how they collaborate with allies to build collective agency with their respective strengths," said Liu.
The blind spots behind AI hardware
However, the team's analysis of AI policy and regulation documents from dozens of countries as well as intergovernmental organizations shows that just over 33% of the identified supply-chain elements are simply not mentioned.
Most of this "invisibility" is in the "physical middle" of the chain. This includes chip design, packaging and the testing of chips, and some of the hardware and software behind "compute" such as making AI servers and "merchant accelerators" (platforms that allow businesses to adopt AI).
An example of a hidden chokepoint highlighted by the report is the EDA (electronic design automation) software used to design AI chips. It is essential for companies like NVIDIA, AMD and Google.
This software is dominated by three firms—Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens EDA in the U.S.—yet receives almost no policy attention, unlike the chips and LLMs that wouldn't exist without it.
Another major "blind spot" is advanced packaging: connecting multiple semiconductor chips into high-performance AI processors essential for frontier models. This packaging is overwhelmingly concentrated in Asian countries and territories such as Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines.
"Policymakers focus on finished chips rather than the ecosystem behind them. They focus on GPUs but ignore the packaging operations needed to turn those chips into usable AI hardware," said Liu.
Japan's overlooked manufacturing strength
Japan emerges as the world's most underrated AI power, with the second-largest number of supply chain positions, directly ahead of China. The report shows 101 Japanese firms hold positions across 69 elements, from silicon wafers to semiconductor testing. However, Japan's own policy documents feature only three of these elements.
The researchers point out that a Japanese company, Ajinomoto, controls more than 95% of the global supply of build-up film, an insulating material needed for advanced AI chip manufacturing.
"Japan's strength comes from equipment, and without it there's no way you can produce the hardware," said Liu. "The supply chain is sequential, so the trickle-down could affect computing capacities of the top frontier models."
Leverage beyond the AI superpowers
The U.K. has little AI-related manufacturing, but holds leverage in chip design IP through Cambridge company Arm (even with majority Japanese SoftBank ownership). It is a base for research and expertise, particularly in AI security, and home to valuable health and genomic data sets.
The report highlights absences from reviewed U.K. policy where it has footholds in the supply chain, such as chip design, and the pure gases needed for semiconductor plants via Linde, one of the world's largest industrial gas companies.
Some of the smaller nations with more clout than they might realize include Belgium, which is strong in recycled semiconductor chemicals and has the major nanoelectronics R&D center Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre (imec).
Ireland has no production supply-chain position, yet it can affect AI capacity through energy and planning as it provides a European base for big U.S. tech companies such as Google and AMD, making it a "host and infrastructure state." Qatar produces much of the world's helium, a vital supply-chain raw material, and is also a huge potential AI investor.
Earlier this year, Nvidia's former CEO Jensen Huang described the AI supply chain as a "five-layer cake" (energy, chips, infrastructure, models and applications).
Harding added, "The AI supply chain is far more complex, and power over it far more diffused, than some simplified narratives might have us believe. Many governments hold more cards than they realize."
The invisible AI supply chain, DOI: 10.17863/CAM.136717
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Analysis of 117 policy documents found that over one-third of 137 AI supply-chain elements were unmentioned, particularly chip design, packaging and supporting technologies. Critical dependencies span 56 countries and territories, limiting national self-sufficiency and highlighting the need for coordinated supply-chain governance.
This summary was automatically generated using LLM. Full disclaimer
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