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Quad9 退出法国:煤矿里的金丝雀

技术栈 来源:Cloudflare Blog 2026-11-18 04:24 0 阅读 机器翻译
Quad9 退出法国:煤矿里的金丝雀

上个月,瑞士非营利基金会 Quad9 宣布将把其免费公共 DNS 解析器撤出法国。这一艰难决定是在经历了数月的诉讼以及法国法院的一项裁决之后做出的,该裁决因 Quad9 未能封锁与涉嫌版权侵权相关的域名而对其处以每日罚款。

Quad9 撤离法国既令人沮丧,也可以理解。法院的裁决使该组织陷入两难境地:要么承受使其难以为继的诉讼和罚款,要么从根本上改变其服务,从而损害用户的隐私与安全。由于没有好的选择,Quad9 转而选择了退出。

一项基础性基础设施服务撤出法国,从根本上损害了自由开放的互联网,它应当成为一个警示:如果版权方和政策制定者继续要求在互联网的每一层都实施最大限度的封锁,将会造成怎样的破坏。这不仅使法国互联网用户失去一个值得信赖的重要工具;还给他们日常生活带来切实的中断风险。Quad9 的解析器被法国众多个人和组织使用——包括政府机构、教育机构、医院和公用事业部门——而 Quad9 无法直接通知这些个人和机构,他们的解析器即将停止工作。如果受影响的各方未在 Quad9 撤走其服务之前更改解析器,他们的互联网将毫无解释地中断。

Quad9 并非第一个因封锁令而从某个国家撤出的公共 DNS 解析器,而且几乎可以肯定它也不会是最后一个。Cisco 此前曾在类似情况下将其 OpenDNS 解析器从法国、葡萄牙撤出,并从比利时暂时撤出。比利时一家法院最近发布命令,如果 Cloudflare、Google 和 Cisco 未能在 2027 年 1 月初之前开始通过其公共解析器封锁网站,将对其处以高额罚款。而封锁网站这件事,Cloudflare 从未做过。

多年来,Cloudflare 一直在发声反对此类命令。我们担心,权利人不断要求通过公共 DNS 解析器实施封锁,最终会对互联网造成实实在在的伤害。

要理解为什么这是一个如此严重的问题,有必要先了解互联网在底层是如何运作的。DNS 解析器是互联网基础设施的基础组成部分。DNS 是互联网的通讯录:当你输入 cloudflare.com 这样的网站名称时,DNS 系统会把这个域名转换为你设备连接它所需的 IP 地址。DNS 解析器就是负责查询该地址并将其返回给你设备的服务,很像接线员在电话簿里查找电话号码。

DNS 解析器可以由任何人运营,但通常由互联网服务提供商(ISP)、移动网络、企业和大学运营。如果你正在家里阅读这篇博客文章,而且此前从未想过 DNS 的事,那你很可能正在使用你的 ISP 提供的默认解析器。由于你每次访问网站都会用到 DNS 解析器,它可靠、可信就非常重要。

而且,由于 DNS 解析器能够获取你的全部浏览活动,你使用哪个解析器会对隐私产生切实影响。

除了本地 ISP 提供的 DNS 解析器之外,还有多种公共 DNS 解析器可供使用。Cloudflare 于 2018 年 4 月推出公共 DNS 解析器 1.1.1.1,以此回馈互联网。我们的目标是让每个人都能免费使用快速、可靠、隐私优先的消费者 DNS 服务。我们做到了。1.1.1.1 是全球最快的 DNS 解析器之一,在欧洲等地也是如此。Cloudflare 的解析器不收集任何用户数据,更不会将其出售给广告商。1.1.1.1 一直是我们最喜欢的例子之一,体现了 Cloudflare 践行其帮助建设更美好互联网的使命。

1.1.1.1 是众多任何人都可以使用的公共解析器之一。除了 1.1.1.1 和 Quad9 的 9.9.9.9 之外,其他一些最知名的公共解析器还包括 Google 的 8.8.8.8 和 Cisco 的 OpenDNS。这些服务免费提供,并不意味着它们容易运营。一个运行良好的全球公共 DNS 解析器是一项非凡的工程壮举,它要在遍布全球数百个服务器位置的分布式网络上,安全且私密地每天解析数千亿甚至数万亿次查询。

正如 Quad9 所指出的,用户可用的 DNS 解析器还有很多,其中许多由实质上匿名的服务提供,其做法不为人知或缺乏记录。更换 DNS 解析器很容易,人们出于各种原因这样做,包括性能、可靠性,或为了使用特定的安全功能。

权利人防止网络盗版具有正当利益。但试图通过公共 DNS 解析器来解决网络侵权问题,从根本上就是错误的做法。

除此之外,这种封锁本身就毫无效果。回想一下那个类比:接线员在电话簿里查找一个电话号码。如果法院想关掉一家非法企业,强迫电话簿运营方把该企业的名字从电话簿里划掉,并不能真正让这家企业关门。店面仍然开着,商品仍然摆在那里,任何已经知道地址、或者换用另一本电话簿的人,都能直接走进去。

互联网上也是如此。DNS 解析器只是传输链条中的一环。DNS 解析器“封锁”内容的唯一方式,就是拒绝返回某个特定网站的 IP 地址。但公共 DNS 解析器既无法把实际侵权内容从互联网上移除,也无法关停托管这些内容的服务器。

正因如此,通过公共 DNS 解析器实施的封锁极其容易被绕过。任何想访问被封锁网站的互联网用户,只要切换到网上可用的数千个其他 DNS 解析器之一,就能在不到一分钟内绕过封锁。事实上,如果用户已经知道底层 IP 地址,他们根本不需要解析器就能访问侵权内容。不出所料,虽然通过公共解析器进行封锁可能会给部分用户访问内容带来一些阻力,但没有证据表明它真的减少了网上侵权行为的总量。

正如我们此前所写,DNS 封锁不仅收效甚微,还是一种会造成附带损害的粗放手段。由于 DNS 在域名层级运作,解析器无法封锁某个具体的侵权视频或文件,只能封锁整个域名。这会影响该域名上的所有内容,无论合法与否。它对用户也完全不透明:当解析器被强制封锁某个域名时,网站只会无法加载。用户得不到任何解释或法律告知,因而无从判断网站是在维护、网络出了故障,还是该网站被法院命令封锁了。

在公共 DNS 解析器方面,问题要严重得多。由于公共解析器在全球范围内运行,任何封锁自然会跨越国界,这意味着单个国家就可能决定全世界可访问哪些内容。例如,由 Whalebone 运营的欧盟专用 DNS 解析器 DNS4EU 虽然依据各国特定的命令实施封锁,但却是在整个欧盟范围内执行。若要通过改造公共 DNS 解析器来实现更本地化的封锁,将从根本改变这一服务,损害性能与韧性,削弱用户隐私,并割裂开放的互联网。

基于这些原因,Cloudflare、Google、Cisco 和 Quad9 都反对强制公共 DNS 解析器实施封锁的做法,并取得了一定成效。几年前,德国法院作出了有利于 Cloudflare 和 Quad9 的裁决,驳回了要求 DNS 封锁的请求。最近,一家法国法院驳回了对 Cloudflare 的处罚,该处罚源于其未通过 1.1.1.1 实施封锁;法院认定,我们已通过 CDN 和反向代理服务采取的其他措施足以遵守相关命令。

尽管如此,版权方仍继续推动公共解析器实施封锁,其决心之坚定令人难以解释。最近一项研究发现,欧洲的大部分在线盗版内容都托管在欧洲。如果版权方真想切实解决在线侵权问题,他们有远比这更值得投入精力的方向——最明显的就是要求实际存储盗版文件的托管服务商将其下架。

法国法院对 Quad9 的处罚令,正是版权方这些努力的最终结果。作为一家仅提供公共 DNS 解析器的小型非营利组织,Quad9 没有其他办法来证明自己遵守该命令。因此,法国法院批准了版权方就未遵守命令施加处罚的请求,迫使 Quad9 要么自毁服务,要么退出该国。

原文较长,译文为节选;译文由英文原文机器翻译,术语按行业惯例统一,可在文末展开原文核对。

查看英文原文(Quad9’s withdrawal from France: A canary in the coal mine)

Last month, the Swiss non-profit foundation Quad9 announced that it will withdraw its free public DNS resolver from France. This difficult decision followed months of litigation and a French court ruling that imposed daily financial penalties on Quad9 for failing to block domains associated with alleged copyright infringement.

Quad9’s departure from France is both disheartening and understandable. The court’s ruling put the organization in the impossible bind of having to choose between crippling litigation and penalties, or fundamentally altering its service in a way that would undermine the privacy and security of its users. Left with no good option, Quad9 is choosing the exit door instead.

The withdrawal of a basic infrastructure service from France fundamentally harms the free and open Internet, and it should serve as a warning of the damage that will result if rightsholders and policymakers continue demanding maximal blocking across every layer of the Internet. It not only deprives French Internet users of a trustworthy and important tool; it creates a real risk of disruption to their daily lives. Quad9’s resolver is used by a wide variety of individuals and organizations in France — including government bodies, educational institutions, hospitals, and utilities — and Quad9 has no way to directly notify those individuals and institutions that their resolver will soon stop working. If the affected parties do not change their resolver before Quad9 removes its service, their Internet will fail with no explanation.

Quad9 is not the first public DNS resolver to withdraw from a country following blocking orders, and it almost certainly won’t be the last. Cisco previously withdrew its OpenDNS resolver from France, Portugal, and Belgium (temporarily) under similar circumstances. And a Belgian court recently issued an order that would impose substantial penalties if Cloudflare, Google, and Cisco do not begin blocking websites through their public resolvers by early January 2027. That’s something Cloudflare has never done.

Cloudflare has spent years advocating against orders of this kind. We are concerned that rightsholders’ unrelenting demands for blocking by public DNS resolvers will end up causing real harm to the Internet.

A refresher on DNS, the Domain Name System

To understand why this is such a problem, it helps to understand how the Internet works under the hood. DNS resolvers are a foundational piece of the Internet’s infrastructure. DNS is the Internet’s address book: when you type a website name such as cloudflare.com, the DNS system translates that domain name into the IP address your device needs to connect to it. A DNS resolver is the service that looks up that address and sends it back to your device, much like an operator finding a phone number in a directory.

DNS resolvers can be operated by anyone, but they are commonly run by Internet service providers (ISPs), mobile networks, businesses, and universities. If you’re reading this blog post at home and have never thought about DNS before, chances are that you’re using your ISP’s default resolver. Because you use your DNS resolver every time that you visit a website, it’s important for it to be reliable and trustworthy.

And because the DNS resolver has access to all of your browsing activity, which resolver you use has real privacy implications.

In addition to DNS resolvers that are provided by your local ISP, there are a variety of public DNS resolvers available. Cloudflare launched our public DNS resolver 1.1.1.1 in April 2018 to give back to the Internet. Our goal was to make a fast, reliable, privacy-first consumer DNS service available for free to everyone. We succeeded. 1.1.1.1 is among the fastest DNS resolvers in the world, including in Europe. Cloudflare's resolver doesn’t collect any user data, let alone sell it to advertisers. 1.1.1.1 has always been one of our favorite examples of Cloudflare fulfilling its mission to help build a better Internet.

1.1.1.1 is one of many public resolvers that anyone can use. In addition to 1.1.1.1 and Quad9’s 9.9.9.9, some of the other best-known public resolvers include Google’s 8.8.8.8 and Cisco’s OpenDNS. Just because these services are offered for free doesn’t mean they’re easy to provide. A well-run global public DNS resolver is an extraordinary engineering feat, built to securely and privately resolve hundreds of billions or even trillions of queries a day across a globally distributed network of hundreds of server locations.

As Quad9 notes, there are many other DNS resolvers available to users, many of them offered by essentially anonymous services whose practices are unknown or undocumented. It’s easy to change your DNS resolver, and people do so for a variety of reasons including performance, reliability, or to access specific security features.

Why public DNS resolvers should not be required to block

Rightsholders have a legitimate interest in preventing online piracy. But trying to address online infringement through public DNS resolvers is fundamentally the wrong approach.

Among other things, such blocking is ineffective. Think back to the analogy of an operator finding a phone number in a directory. If a court wants to shut down an illegal business, forcing the directory operator to cross the business's name out of the phone book doesn't actually close the business. The storefront is still open, the products are still there, and anyone who already knows the address, or uses a different phone book, can walk in.

The same is true for the Internet. DNS resolvers are just one link in the transmission chain. The only way a DNS resolver can “block” content is by declining to return the IP address for a particular website. But a public DNS resolver cannot remove the actual infringing content from the Internet, nor can it take down the servers hosting it.

Because of this, blocking by public DNS resolvers is remarkably easy to bypass. Any Internet user who wants to reach a blocked site can circumvent the block in less than a minute simply by switching to one of the thousands of other DNS resolvers available online. In fact, users don’t even need a resolver at all to reach infringing content if they already know the underlying IP address. Unsurprisingly, while blocking via public resolvers may inject some friction for some users when accessing content, there is no evidence that it actually reduces the total amount of online infringement that occurs.

In addition to being ineffective, as we’ve written previously, DNS blocking is a blunt instrument that causes collateral damage. Because DNS operates at the domain level, a resolver cannot block a specific infringing video or file; it must block the entire domain. This affects all content on that domain, whether legal or illegal. It is also entirely opaque to the user: when a resolver is forced to block a domain, the website simply fails to load. The user receives no explanation or legal notice, making it impossible to know if the site is down for maintenance, if their network is broken, or if the site was blocked by a court order.

The problem is substantially worse with respect to public DNS resolvers. Because public resolvers operate globally, any blocking will naturally cross borders, meaning that a single country could dictate what content is accessible around the world. For example, while the EU-dedicated DNS resolver DNS4EU operated by Whalebone blocks in response to country-specific orders, it does so across the entire EU. Efforts to reengineer public DNS resolvers to allow for more localized blocking would fundamentally alter the service, harming performance and resilience, undermining user privacy, and fragmenting the open Internet.

For these reasons, Cloudflare, Google, Cisco, and Quad9 have all opposed efforts to mandate blocking by public DNS resolvers, with some success. Several years ago, courts in Germany ruled in favor of Cloudflare and Quad9, rejecting requests to require DNS blocking. More recently, a French court rejected penalties against Cloudflare for failing to block through 1.1.1.1, finding that other actions we had taken through our CDN and reverse-proxy service were sufficient to comply with the underlying order.

Undeterred, rightsholders have continued to press for blocking by public resolvers with a level of determination that is hard to explain. A recent study found that the majority of online piracy in Europe is hosted in Europe. If rightsholders want to genuinely address online infringement, there are far better places to focus their efforts — most notably by requiring the hosting providers who actually store the pirated files to take them down.

Forcing public DNS resolvers out of markets hurts the Internet

The French court’s penalty order against Quad9 represents the culmination of these rightsholder efforts. As a small non-profit that only offers a public DNS resolver, Quad9 had no alternative methods for demonstrating compliance with the order. The French court therefore granted rightsholders’ request to issue penalties for non-compliance, forcing Quad9 to undermine its own service or leave the country.

Quad9’s withdrawal from France represents a genuine loss for the Internet. In the short term, removal of Quad9’s resolver is likely to cause immediate and potentially severe disruptions to Internet access. Because of the way their service is set up to preserve privacy, Quad9 has no way to know who exactly is using its resolver, let alone to directly communicate to them about the upcoming withdrawal of services. That means that individuals, hospitals, universities, and government offices all may be caught unaware when the resolver stops working. Again, because of how DNS resolvers work, those users will not receive a detailed error message explaining what happened — their Internet will simply stop working. The problem will be even worse when devices like security systems or thermostats are hardwired to use Quad9’s resolver. Fixing these issues may be slow or even impossible.

More generally, driving Quad9 out of France does absolutely nothing to prevent online infringement, but it does leave everyday Internet users with fewer safe, reliable options, particularly ones like Quad9 that also protect users from phishing and malware. Taking established public DNS resolvers away forces Internet users to fall back on the default resolvers offered by their ISPs (which may monetize their browsing data), try lesser-known resolvers operated by anonymous or less trustworthy organizations, or run their own resolver. The irony is that Quad9 and Cloudflare are being pulled into court precisely because we are transparent, reputable organizations. Penalizing transparent services only pushes users toward less accountable corners of the web.

The way forward

If nothing else, we hope that Quad9’s announcement may serve as a wake-up call to rightsholders and policymakers that seeking to block infringement at every layer of the Internet has real costs.

We believe there are far better ways to work together to fight piracy without compromising the integrity of the Internet, and Cloudflare continues to pursue innovative collaborations to that end. Our collective efforts in addressing online infringement would be put to better use in seeking to have such content removed at the hosting provider, which would both achieve a more durable solution and avoid collateral damage to the Internet.

In the meantime, we will keep resisting misguided efforts to require blocking by public DNS resolvers. Along with Google and Cisco, we have appealed the Belgian order that would impose penalties on us if we do not start DNS blocking by January 2027. We hope to get a resolution before the end of the year that would avoid another situation like the one Quad9 faces now in France.

We have grave concerns about the disruption that would be caused if additional resolvers are forced to withdraw from markets, and we will continue to advocate against that possible result.

正文保留英文原文,标题与摘要由机器翻译。

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原文发布于 Cloudflare Blog(Quad9’s withdrawal from France: A canary in the coal mine),标题、摘要与正文由机器翻译,术语按行业惯例统一,未经人工逐句校订。

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