NVIDIA 安全团队当时在哪儿?

外界几乎没有理由注意到,Nvidia 任职多年的首席安全官兼产品安全负责人于 8 月卸任。仅仅两个半月后,CEO Jensen Huang 本人也离开了公司,原因是他婚外情相关的质疑不断发酵——最初涉及 Megaspeed,一家新加坡数据中心公司,美国调查人员怀疑其将 Nvidia 芯片转运至中国,随后又扩大到有关他与 Nvidia 员工两起婚外情的报道。
当时,David Reber——担任 CSO 四年、在 Nvidia 总计七年——表示他因健康原因离职。“这不是我计划中的转向。但我知道什么必须排在首位:家庭和健康,”他在 8 月下旬在 LinkedIn 上写道,并透露自己两年多前被诊断出早发型帕金森病。
接替 Reber 的 Saša Zdjelar 此前在休斯敦的 ExxonMobil 工作 17 年,离职时担任高级 IT 经理,之后在 Salesforce 工作一年,又在网络安全公司 ReversingLabs 工作数年。Zdjelar 周四未回应有关此次交接或安全团队知情情况的提问。
没有任何公开信息将 Reber 或 Zdjelar 的职务变动与 Megaspeed 事件联系起来,但人们似乎有理由追问:Nvidia 的安全团队对政府对 Megaspeed 的审查以及 Huang 的感情关系了解多少,是否有人提出过担忧。Reber 周四未回应提问。Nvidia 也未回答我们的相关问题。
并非所有这些关系都属于安全团队的职责范围。与下属的关系通常由人力资源、法务和董事会负责。但与一家正接受联邦调查的公司的高管发生婚外情,则是另一回事。(Megaspeed 否认存在任何不当行为。)安全专家表示,婚外情可能制造出外国情报机构会加以利用的漏洞。
要发现这类暴露风险并不容易。退役高级情报官员 Nicholas Eftimiades 表示,情报机构收集信息的方式——其中大部分是通过日常对话而非黑客攻击——让安全团队尤其难以识别风险。他称自己培训过 1000 多名企业安全专业人员。
Nvidia 内部一些人显然知道部分情况。《纽约时报》本周早些时候报道,Nvidia 的首席律师一年多前就参与了政府对 Megaspeed 的调查。(Nvidia 曾表示其会定期与官员联系。)有关黄仁勋与员工关系的报道表明,同事也知晓这些关系,即便该行为并未被 Nvidia 的行为准则明确禁止。《纽约时报》援引五名 Nvidia 员工的话称,他与一名直接向他汇报的副总裁有牵连,路透社随后援引两名知情人士报道了第二段关系。目前不清楚的是,这些情况是否有任何一部分传到了安全部门。
即便这条信息传到了 Nvidia 的安全团队,Eftimiades——他曾于 2020 年撰写《中国间谍活动与战术》(Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics)——也表示,安全团队的资源往往有限。原因之一是,它们常常经费不足,因为与其他一些成本中心不同,它们并不创造收入。他说,CEO 们在回应安全团队的警告时,最常说的一句话就是“除了合规,一个子儿也不多给”,这种情况普遍得惊人。
专家表示,许多公司对安全的定义也非常狭窄。在企业调查公司 Interfor International 的 CEO Don Aviv 与作家 Jeremy Hurewitz 发表于 The Hill 的一篇评论文章中,两人写道:“太多公司仍主要把安全视为保护设施、防范网络攻击和应对人身威胁的问题。”他们主张,“安全团队需要更加关注内部威胁,包括外国情报机构对高管和员工的拉拢培养、可疑的商业关系、利益冲突,以及通过可信的私人关系获取敏感信息的企图。”
不过,有些事情超出了任何团队的能力范围。Eftimiades 泛泛而谈,并非针对黄仁勋,他举了一个假设场景:一位 CEO 抱怨自己做不了某件事,因为“我在跟一个不想这么做的董事会较劲”。这就等于告诉情报资产障碍是谁。情报机构随后会问:“卡点在哪里?”并设法进入那个人的邮箱和手机。
竞争对手的情报机构想要的往往不是技术,而是政策洞察,包括谁在推动修改出口规则、谁是最大的阻碍者。他说:“情报界往往像癌症一样。一旦进入机体,它就会设法扩散,设法向外延伸。”
Eftimiades 补充说,这套手法并不新鲜,“尤其是对中国而言”。任何与这个国家打交道的企业高管“都会告诉你,他们曾被接触过”。他说,还有“大量外交官的故事”,讲的是美国外交官走进酒店房间,发现床上有一名女子。他说,与苏联时代的间谍活动相比,更新的一点在于,这些情报机构如今培养的关系往往持续数年,而不是数周。
Eftimiades 表示,技术可以增强这类人力情报,并以 IMSI 捕获器为例。这些设备会模仿手机基站,使附近的手机连接到它们。他说,基础版本售价约 1,000 美元,能装进手提箱,但政府级型号要贵得多。
Eftimiades 说,目前无人知道这些手段是否被用于针对黄仁勋;据推测,他的手机已做了加固,因此即便无法完全阻止入侵,也能检测到。但无论如何,随着董事会的独立调查和联邦调查推进,Nvidia 安全团队当时知道什么、以及是否本可以据此采取行动,应该会变得更加清晰。
与此同时,Eftimiades 表示,他希望整个事件能给美国产业界敲响“警钟”,他说美国产业界对中国的策略大多“一无所知”。“我们在知识产权上损失了数万亿美元,”这是他的猜测。“无论我们自以为在做什么,都没有奏效。”
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查看英文原文(Where was Nvidia’s security team?)
Outsiders had little reason to notice when Nvidia’s longtime chief security officer and head of product security stepped down in August. Just two and a half months later, CEO Jensen Huang himself left the company over growing questions about his extramarital relationships — starting with an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore data center company that U.S. investigators suspect of funneling Nvidia chips to China, then widening to reports about two separate affairs with Nvidia employees.
At the time, David Reber, who spent four years as CSO and seven at Nvidia overall, said he was leaving for health reasons. “This wasn’t a pivot I had planned. But I know what needs to come first: family and health,” he wrote on LinkedIn in late August, disclosing that he’d been diagnosed with young-onset Parkinson’s more than two years ago.
Reber’s replacement, Saša Zdjelar, previously spent 17 years at ExxonMobil in Houston, leaving as a senior IT manager before spending one year at Salesforce and several years at the cybersecurity company ReversingLabs. Zdjelar didn’t respond to questions Thursday about the transition or what the security team knew.
Nothing public connects Reber’s or Zdjelar’s role changes to the Megaspeed matter, but it seems fair to wonder what Nvidia’s security team knew about the government’s scrutiny of Megaspeed and about Huang’s relationships, and whether anyone raised concerns. Reber didn’t respond to questions Thursday. Nvidia also has not answered our related questions.
Not all of those relationships are the business of the security team. Relationships with subordinates typically fall to HR, legal, and the board. But an affair with an executive at a company under federal investigation is a different animal. (Megaspeed has denied any wrongdoing.) Security specialists say affairs can create vulnerabilities that foreign intelligence services look to exploit.
Catching that kind of exposure isn’t easy. The way intelligence services collect information, much of it through everyday conversation rather than hacking, makes it especially difficult for security teams to identify risks, according to retired senior intelligence officer Nicholas Eftimiades, who says he has trained more than 1,000 corporate security professionals.
Some people inside Nvidia clearly knew parts of the picture. Nvidia’s top lawyer was engaged with the government’s Megaspeed inquiry more than a year ago, The New York Times reported earlier this week. (Nvidia has said it regularly contacts officials.) Reports about Huang’s relationships with employees suggest colleagues also knew of them, even if the behavior is not expressly forbidden by Nvidia’s code of conduct. The Times cited five Nvidia employees who said he was involved with a vice president who reported directly to him, and Reuters, citing two people, later reported a second relationship. What’s unclear is whether any of that reached security.
Even if it had reached Nvidia’s security team, Eftimiades, who wrote Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics in 2020, said a security team’s resources are often limited. For one thing, they’re often underfunded because, unlike some other cost centers, they don’t drive revenue. It’s astonishingly common for CEOs to answer a security team’s warnings with “not a nickel more than compliance,” he said.
Many companies also define security very narrowly, specialists say. In an opinion piece in The Hill, Don Aviv, CEO of the corporate investigations firm Interfor International, and author Jeremy Hurewitz, wrote, “Too many companies still approach security primarily as a matter of protecting facilities, preventing cyberattacks, and responding to physical threats.” The two argued that “[s]ecurity teams need to pay greater attention to insider threats, including the cultivation of executives and employees by foreign intelligence services, suspicious business relationships, conflicts of interest and attempts to obtain sensitive information through trusted personal contacts.”
Still, some of it is beyond what any team can do. Speaking generally, not about Huang, Eftimiades offered a hypothetical in which a CEO complains that he can’t do something because “I’m fighting a board who doesn’t want to do this.” That tells an intelligence asset who the obstacle is. The service then asks, “Who’s the sticking point here?” and looks for ways into that person’s email and phone.
What a rival intelligence service wants is often less technology than policy insight, including who’s pushing to change export rules and who the biggest blocker is. “Intel world tends to be like cancer,” he said. “Once it gets into the body, it looks to spread and looks to reach out.”
The playbook isn’t new, Eftimiades added, “particularly for China.” Any executive dealing with the country “will tell you that they’ve been approached.” He said there are also “tons of diplomat stories” of U.S. diplomats walking into a hotel room to find a woman on the bed. He said what’s newer compared with Soviet era spying is the relationships these services cultivate now often last years, not weeks.
Technology can augment that human intelligence, Eftimiades said, pointing to IMSI catchers are one example. These devices mimic a cell tower so that nearby phones connect to them. A basic version can cost about $1,000 and fit in a suitcase, he said, though government-grade models cost far more.
Eftimiades says no one knows yet if these were used against Huang, whose phone was presumably hardened such that compromises could be detected, if not stopped altogether. But either way, what Nvidia’s security team knew, and whether it could have acted on it, should become clearer as the board’s independent investigation and federal inquiries proceed.
In the meantime, Eftimiades said he hopes the whole episode is “a wake-up call” for U.S. industry, which he said is mostly “clueless” about China’s tactics. “We have lost trillions [of dollars] in intellectual property,” is his guess. “Whatever we think we’re doing isn’t working.”
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