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应对 AI 渗透测试编排器:现代安全模型

技术栈 来源:Cloudflare Blog 2026-11-14 03:26 0 阅读 机器翻译
应对 AI 渗透测试编排器:现代安全模型

在过去一个月里,大语言模型(LLM)渗透测试与编排框架的数量呈爆发式增长。就在几周前,ARTEX——一个开源智能体式渗透测试系统,可自动化执行攻击性安全工作流——还是唯一可用的框架。而仅在最近三天内,我们就看到超过 50 个框架家族试图对全球的 Cloudflare 客户进行扫描。运行这些框架的 IP 地址数量已增长至数千个,且仍在逐日增加。这些框架的激增已显著改变了网络防御的现状:防御方正艰难应对这些自主引导式攻击在流量规模上的冲击。

ARTEX 于 10 月 8 日被其创建者 Autumn-27 下架。(他们用中文写道:“对这一工具的恶意利用完全违背了它的初衷。”)但在此后一个月里,其生态呈爆发式扩张,涌现出大量碎片化的新版本。目前已有超过 12,000 个代码仓库,其中数百个独立分支可溯源自原始仓库。此外,自 10 月 8 日以来还出现了数百个其他类似的智能体式编排框架。自 10 月 1 日以来,AI 渗透测试(pentesting)与漏洞利用工具的每日请求量增长了 30 倍。在一些更复杂的攻击中,这些工具还开始串联使用窃取来的客户凭据,例如在整个环境中进行横向移动串联。

我们预计这些框架将持续扩散,每个组织都应做好准备应对这一威胁。为对抗基于 LLM 的渗透测试框架,我们建议所有组织采用我们所称的“现代安全模型”,该模型包含六大关键支柱:

开源渗透测试框架能够编排 AI 智能体,大规模执行传统网络杀伤链的各个阶段。像 ARTEX 这样的工具能够快速接入现有的 Model Context Protocol (MCP),并以新颖方式连接传统独立渗透测试工具。有些甚至允许操作员指定要完成何种类型的任务。这些工具可以从内部和外部映射和枚举环境。ARTEX 及其分叉将资产和环境映射到图(graph)上,使多个独立的并行智能体能够以推理速度进行枚举、验证、原型开发和攻击。这些工具将攻陷转化为一个可逐步爬坡的问题,而智能体尤其擅长这类问题。

我们目前正在跟踪 50+ 个 AI LLM 智能体。下表展示了排名前五的 LLM 渗透与利用编排器。每一个都极受欢迎(GitHub 星标 1k+)且完全自主。这些智能体的完全自主特性代表了进攻性网络能力的作战理念转变:

架构

规划模型

内置能力/执行环境

后渗透利用能力

ARTEX(及其分叉)

规划器与并行智能体

目标、线索与发现的图与目标独立的资产图相关联

直接运行在主机或具备网络/root 权限的容器上,可按需安装/开发工具

无内置能力,需要用户指令

LuaN1aoAgent

监督智能体、规划智能体和通用执行智能体

三个图,分别包含目标/任务/阻塞项、证据/假设/利用方式,以及目标/本地

具备网络/用户权限的容器,可按需开发工具并安装用户软件包

内置 SSH 和 Chisel 用于隧道连接,并在连接中断后尝试重连

编排器智能体调度专家子智能体

带前置条件的目标图

Kali 容器以 root 身份运行,可按需开发工具

专用的访问后、Active Directory 和云横向移动技能

调度器将工作编排到现有 AI 执行框架(Codex、Claude Code、Pi)

事实与线索图;新节点触发调度器

具有 root 访问权限的 Kali 容器,或直接在主机上运行,可按需开发工具

提示词指导与 Kali 工具

PentestGPT-Agent

监督者智能体与一个通用执行者智能体

带依赖关系、目标和证据的任务列表

在主机上运行,可按需开发工具

无内置能力,需要用户指令

截至 11 月 12 日,ARTEX 及其分支版本占目前已知 AI 渗透测试编排器的 60% 以上。下图有助于我们了解过去六周这些工具的采用情况发生了怎样的变化。自 10 月 8 日原始 ARTEX 仓库被移除以来,流量增长了十倍以上,而自 10 月 1 日以来增长已超过 30 倍。

如上所示,10 月 8 日 ARTEX 被下架(以及对此的广泛报道)很可能引发了一种“九头蛇效应”:原始仓库被移除,反而导致分支和修改版本数量大幅增加,这从 10 月 8 日前后独立实例数量的急剧加速增长中可以看出。

过去八周里,我们的 Cloudforce One 团队被邀请参与多起事件响应调查,这些调查涉及 ARTEX 以及由 ARTEX 衍生的 LLM 漏洞利用框架。我们亲眼看到泄露的凭据如何与基于 LLM 的漏洞利用框架串联使用,从而在与防御者的对抗中占据上风。我们观察到多起事件:威胁行为者获得对超大规模云服务商环境的初始访问权限,并直接横向移动进入客户的 Cloudflare 环境。根因分析揭示了一个常见的凭据管理疏漏。攻击者反复攻陷在 CI/CD 流水线中运行的静态、永不过期的 Token,这些 Token 授予了覆盖组织超大规模云基础设施的广泛、跨环境访问权限。LLM 框架大大提高了客户端 API 密钥被横向利用、进而接管其他租户环境的可能性。

在一次事件响应调查中,我们的团队观察到 ARTEX 获取了一个此前用于 CI/CD、且没有 IP 限制或速率限制的已泄露账户级 API Token 的访问权限。现有证据表明,此次泄露最有可能源自一家第三方超大规模云服务商。

我们观察到,大量新的 Worker 脚本被创建,名称各不相同,例如 artex-*、artex-pgrecon-*、artex-pgw-* 和 artex-do-*。每个 Worker 脚本的命名都与其执行的不同行为和操作相关,并且通常带有一个字母数字标识符作为后缀。我们观察到,其 Cloudflare 基础设施的多个不同部分出现了超过每分钟 69 次请求的活动,以及一小时内 400 次数据库转储请求。我们还观察到了尝试建立持久化的机制,以及尝试验证其他第三方应用的会话 Token 的行为。尽管我们认为这些活动在很大程度上受到人类操作者的轻度引导,但这只是 ARTEX 和类似框架在入侵后所能达到的速度和广度的一个例子。

大语言模型增强了威胁行为者针对目标快速推进网络杀伤链的能力。它们通过为行为者提供速度和验证方面的优势来实现这一点。网络杀伤链的每一步都可以得到验证,并输入到攻击的下一阶段。这种编排水平无与伦比,并实际上使传统的网络安全模型失效。必须使用现代模型来防御这些攻击。

为了进一步解释这一模型,让我们用保护庄园中一栋房子作为比喻。下文每一节都概述了如何在每一步防御该威胁。

在任何人甚至踏上你的草坪之前,他们必须先到达外围围栏。

在缺乏防护的园区里,攻击者可以驱使无穷无尽的诱饵卡车径直冲进你的车道,彻底堵死入口并撞破路障(第 3/4 层流量型洪水攻击和直接 IP 探测)。

有了外围大门安防之后,所有入站流量都会被路由到数英里之外那些大规模、分布式的外门上。异常的送货卡车被过滤分流到高速公路上,试图窃听你物业的非法公用设施隧道被切断,只有合法的行人流量才能抵达你的住所地址。

网络流量控制在阻止流量型攻击方面发挥着重要作用。

访客一旦抵达主入口,就会在门厅遇到一道严格的安全检查站。

自动化的潜入者不会只是踹门;它们会伪装自己。它们会尝试各种古怪的进门方式——往锁里塞纸,尝试 //front-door//back-room/ 之类的变体路径,诱骗机械装置把门弹开。

门口的保安执行着明确的规则:

Web 应用防火墙(WAF)通过速率限制和异常检测,在阻止应用层漏洞利用方面是关键防御机制。

高明的入侵者很少看起来像蒙面窃贼;他们会伪装成普通访客。但自动化智能体、无头浏览器爬虫和 AI 侦察工具的行为并不像真人。

原文较长,译文为节选;译文由英文原文机器翻译,术语按行业惯例统一,可在文末展开原文核对。

查看英文原文(Adapting to AI penetration testing orchestrators: The Modern Security Model)

Over the last month, the number of Large Language Model (LLM) penetration testing and orchestration frameworks has exploded. Just a few weeks ago, ARTEX — an open source agentic penetration testing system that automates offensive security workflows — was the only framework available. In just the last three days, we have seen over 50 framework families attempt to scan Cloudflare customers globally. The number of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses seen running these frameworks has grown into the thousands and continues to increase daily. The proliferation of these frameworks has significantly changed the status quo in cyber defense: defenders are struggling to keep up with the volumetric nature of these autonomously guided attacks.

ARTEX was taken down by its creator Autumn-27 on October 8. (“The malicious exploitation of this tool runs entirely counter to its original intent,” they wrote in Chinese.) But in the month since, the ecosystem has exploded with new fragmented versions of it. There are now over 12,000 repositories, with several hundred unique forks containing lineage from the original repository. Additionally, hundreds of other similar agentic orchestration frameworks have been created since October 8. Daily requests of AI penetration testing (pentesting) and exploitation tools has grown by 30x since October 1. These tools have also begun chaining stolen customer credentials in some of the more complex attacks, such as lateral movement chaining throughout an environment.

We expect these frameworks to continue to proliferate, and every organization should be prepared to address this threat. To counter LLM-based pentest frameworks, we recommend that all organizations adopt what we call the Modern Security Model, which has six key pillars:

  • Fortify the front gate: Implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) with advanced rules such as rate limits.
  • Security station in the foyer: Anomaly detection on all web applications your customers access.
  • Identify phony visitors: Implement Bot Defense.
  • Remove the back door: Implement Identity-Gated Access for all high-risk external and internal web applications.
  • Inspect deliveries: Enforce validated schemas and explicit security controls.
  • Neighborhood watch: Implement Threat Intelligence to gain visibility into attacks.

What is an LLM penetration and exploitation orchestrator?

Open-source pentesting frameworks are able to orchestrate AI agents to carry out stages of the traditional Cyber Kill Chain at scale. Tools like ARTEX have the ability to quickly plug in existing Model Context Protocol (MCP) and connect traditional standalone pentesting tools in novel ways. Some even allow operator direction on what type of task to accomplish. These tools can map and enumerate environments, both from the inside and outside. ARTEX and its forks map assets and environments onto a graph, allowing multiple independent parallel agents to enumerate, verify, prototype, and attack at the speed of inference. These tools turn compromises into a hill-climbable problem, which agents are specifically good at.

The AI LLM pentesting tools that currently exist

We are currently tracking 50+ AI LLM agents. The table below shows the top five LLM penetration and exploitation orchestrators. Each is extremely popular (1k+ GitHub stars) and fully autonomous. The fully autonomous nature of these agents represents a doctrinal shift in offensive cyber capabilities:

  • Human skills are no longer the limit: A harness performs every step of the OODA loop by observing the environment, orienting itself to prioritize valuable and/or vulnerable targets, decide on an action, and act autonomously.
  • Speed increase: Having multiple parallel agents working towards a goal is a large shift compared to single operator or multiple operator augmented by AI.
  • Scale: A single operator can target multiple organizations at the same time, greatly increasing their blast radius.
  • Small mistakes are easily discovered: Autonomous frameworks relentlessly and systematically test exposed services, including their configurations.

Architecture

Planning model

Built-in capabilities/execution environment

Post-exploitation capabilities

ARTEX (and forks)

Planner and parallel agents

Graph of goals, leads, and findings is linked to separate asset graph of target

Directly on host or container with network/root access, can install/develop tools as needed

Nothing built-in, requires user instruction

LuaN1aoAgent

Supervisor agent, planner agent, and generic executor agents

Three graphs, with goals/tasks/blockers, evidence/hypothesises/exploits, and target/local

Container with network/user access, can develop tools as needed and install user packages

Built-in SSH and Chisel for tunneling and attempted reconnection after disruption

Decepticon

Orchestrator agent dispatching specialist sub-agents

Graph of objectives with prerequisites

Kali container running as root, can develop tools as needed

Dedicated post-access, Active Directory and cloud pivoting skills

Cairn

Dispatcher orchestrating work to existing AI harnesses (Codex, Claude Code, Pi)

Graph of facts and leads; new nodes trigger dispatcher

Kali container with root access or directly on host, can develop tools as needed

Prompt guidance and Kali tools

PentestGPT-Agent

Supervisor agent and one generic executor agent

Task list with dependencies, goals, and evidence

Run on host, can develop tools as needed

Nothing built-in, requires user instruction

Observations from the world's largest network

As of November 12, ARTEX and its forks make up over 60% of currently known AI penetration testing orchestrators. The charts below help us understand how adoption of these tools has changed over the past six weeks. Since the removal of the original ARTEX repository on October 8, traffic has grown more than tenfold, and has increased more than 30x since October 1.

As demonstrated above, the takedown of ARTEX on October 8 (and widespread reporting of it) likely caused a hydra effect, where the removal of the original repository led to a massive increase in the number of forks and modifications which can be seen in the steep acceleration of unique instances around October 8.

Identity-chained LLM exploitation

Over the last eight weeks, our Cloudforce One team has been called into multiple incident response investigations involving ARTEX and ARTEX-derived LLM exploitation frameworks. We’ve seen firsthand how exposed credentials are being chained with LLM-based exploitation frameworks to gain the upper hand over defenders.
We observed multiple incidents in which a threat actor gained initial access to a hyperscaler environment and pivoted directly into the customer's Cloudflare environment. Root-cause analysis revealed a common credential hygiene failure. Attackers repeatedly compromised static, non-expiring tokens running inside CI/CD pipelines, which granted broad, cross-environment access across the organization's hyperscaler infrastructure. LLM frameworks greatly expand the likelihood of a client’s API key being laterally leveraged to take over other tenant environments.

ARTEX in action

As part of one incident response investigation, our team observed ARTEX gaining access to a compromised account-level API token previously used for CI/CD with no IP restrictions or rate limiting. Available evidence indicated that the compromise most likely originated through a third-party hyperscaler.

We observed that a large number of new Worker scripts had been created with distinct names such as artex-*, artex-pgrecon-*, artex-pgw-*, and artex-do-*. The naming of each Worker script correlated to distinct behaviors and actions it was taking, and was often postfixed by an alphanumeric identifier. We observed activity in excess of 69 requests per minute across multiple unique parts of their Cloudflare infrastructure and 400 database dump requests in an hour. We also observed attempted persistence mechanisms and attempts to validate session tokens for other third-party applications. While we believe that much of this activity was lightly guided by the human operator, this is just one example of the speed and breadth that ARTEX and similar frameworks can achieve post-compromise.

Our recommendation: the Modern Security Model

Large Language Models increase the ability of a threat actor to rapidly iterate through the Cyber Kill Chain against a target. They do this by giving the actor the advantage of speed and validation. Each step of the Cyber Kill Chain can be validated and fed into the next stage of the attack. This level of orchestration is unparalleled and effectively vaporizes legacy cyber security models. A modern model must be used against these attacks.

To help explain this model further, let’s use the metaphor of protecting a house on an estate. Each section below outlines how to defend against the threat at each step.

Fortify the front gate: implement traffic control and a WAF with advanced rules

Before anyone even sets foot on your lawn, they have to reach the perimeter fence.

On an unprotected estate, an adversary can drive an endless fleet of decoy trucks straight into your driveway, completely blocking the entrance and smashing through the barriers (Layer 3/4 volumetric floods and direct IP probing).

With perimeter gate security in place, all incoming traffic is routed through massive, distributed outer gates miles away from the main house. Rogue delivery trucks are filtered out to the highway, rogue utility tunnels trying to wiretap your property are severed, and only legitimate foot traffic ever reaches your home address.

Network traffic control serves as an important role in stopping volumetric attacks.

A security station in the foyer: anomaly detection

Once visitors arrive at the main entry, they meet a strict security station at the foyer.

Automated prowlers don't just kick the door; they disguise themselves. They attempt weird ways to get in the door — stuffing paper into the lock, trying variations like //front-door//back-room/ to trick the mechanism into swinging open.

The security guard at the door enforces clear rules:

  • You cannot knock 500 times in five seconds.
  • You cannot disguise your path with trickery.
  • You cannot attempt to roll a massive flatbed cart through the front hall to haul away the house's internal blueprints (diagnostic heap dumps). Suspicious behavior is turned away immediately.
  • Implement security keys and hardware based FIDO keys.

Web Application Firewall (WAF) serves as a key defense mechanism in stopping application exploitation through rate limits and anomaly detection.

Identify phony visitors: implement Bot Defense

A sophisticated intruder rarely looks like a masked burglar; they disguise themselves as ordinary visitors. But automated agents, headless browser scrapers, and AI reconnaissance tools don't act like real people.

They don't blink, their posture is unnervingly rigid, their cadence is mechanical, and their "identification" is often a sloppy imitation of a real visitor badge.

Bot Defense and challenges act as behavioral specialists watching the crowd through one-way glass. It flags the unnatural cadence, catches the synthetic micro-behaviors, and quietly escorts the machines off the property before they can touch a single doorknob.

Remove the back door: implement Identity-Gated Access and micro-segmentation

Many homes historically were built with side doors or a cellar hatch (internal admin panels, /actuator diagnostic endpoints, and remote gateways). Even if locked, a prowler could stand on the sidewalk, shine a flashlight on the cellar door, and start picking the lock.

Zero Trust application access does something radical: it bricks up the doorway from the outside and restricts which rooms can be entered.

To anyone wandering the perimeter, the cellar door does not exist. There is no lock to pick, no handle to rattle, and no light on inside. The only way in is with an escort who checks your biometric badge, confirms your device has a clean bill of health, and steps you directly into the specific room you need — leaving the rest of the house out of view.

For those who do enter, you have to ensure they cannot breach rooms next to the room they enter. Micro-segmentation is a highly effective strategy at stopping lateral movement. It limits compromised credentials from breaching production, test, and development systems.

Inspect deliveries: enforce validated schemas and explicit security controls

You receive daily supply deliveries to your estate — groceries, mail, maintenance parts. In digital terms, this is your incoming API traffic, which must be inspected and verified.

Intruders often attempt to bypass controls by sending unvalidated payloads or forged delivery manifests meant for restricted internal systems.

The porch protocol mandates thorough inspection and schema validation for all traffic:

  • Every incoming request must undergo OpenAPI schema validation to ensure it strictly conforms to expected definitions and structures.
  • Drivers and couriers must present validated mutual TLS (mTLS) certificates to establish trusted, authenticated connections.
  • Any request failing inspection or missing valid credentials is rejected immediately at the boundary.
  • Default-Deny Posture: Every positive security implementation ends with an explicit deny-all rule at the bottom of the ruleset.

Neighborhood watch: implement threat intelligence to gain visibility into attacks

Even with ironclad walls, an isolated property can be vulnerable if a syndicate invents a brand-new infiltration technique across town.

Threat intelligence acts as your warning network with neighboring estates. When a rogue actor sets up a new command-and-control safehouse down the road or begins deploying dynamic tunneling vans in your district, you receive an early dossier. Your estate updates its watchlists, recalibrates its sensors, and slams the gate shut before the actor ever turns onto your street.

How to get real-time help

ARTEX and similar LLM-based frameworks pose a significant challenge to legacy cyber defense models. Even the historical defense-in-depth model — which emphasizes a classic network DMZ — falls short in today's complex architectures. Tomorrow's attacks will only advance as orchestration tools become the new normal.

Securing legacy equipment and on-premises devices requires an identity-gated approach that logically makes these devices impossible to reach on the Internet. Beyond identity, slowing or making lateral movement more noisy is the goal of micro-segmentation. This architecture emphasizes a containment-first approach to security, which is essential when users are consistently losing their keys. When combined, the elements of the Modern Security Model are the answer to this vexing problem.

If you are facing an active security incident and need the Cloudforce One team on the ground to help respond to the incident or require threat intelligence support, please contact us immediately. If you need help implementing the Modern Security Model outlined here, please contact our Solutions Engineering team.

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原文发布于 Cloudflare Blog(Adapting to AI penetration testing orchestrators: The Modern Security Model),标题、摘要与正文由机器翻译,术语按行业惯例统一,未经人工逐句校订。

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