智能体不是人(但有点像)

如今,AI 智能体正在为数百万人上网执行操作。对网站(Site)而言,智能体可以有多种形态。它可能和正在执行任务的人类用户难以区分,也可能看起来像是一个访客代表着许多用户。这使网站失去了识别、服务并追究智能体背后用户的责任的能力,也导致一旦出问题,成本要由网站承担。本文认为,为了让网站最大限度地放开对智能体的访问,整个生态必须发展出新的机制,来维系网站与用户之间的关系。在安全与反欺诈领域,传统上这需要三样东西:身份、信誉和问责,从而让网站能够回答:正在行动的这一方是否如实说明了自己的身份?这个人是否可信?以及谁为这一行为负责?
“个人 AI 智能体”(简称“智能体”)是一类自动化程序,它们接受人类(“用户”)的指令,通过操控云端计算机或浏览器来追求某个目标。它们通常由“运营方”托管和维护,作为托管服务或面向消费者的产品的一部分。例子包括 Meta 的 Muse 和 OpenAI 的 dots,而且新产品一直在不断推出。智能体有可能在网上采取其用户所能采取的任何行动,且不受那些束缚人类的限制。它们不会疲倦,可以全天候运行,可以并行行动,还能忍受没有人愿意忍受的摩擦。网络的很大一部分——从网站如何规划容量到如何赚钱——都建立在那些限制之上。
从根本上说,远程托管的智能体是中介。中介是指任何位于用户与站点之间的东西,因此站点看到的是它,而不是用户。智能体是最新出现的一类中介,但中介已经存在了很长时间。云浏览器(由软件代表用户控制的托管浏览器)和代理(中继用户流量的服务,包括 VPN)同样是中介。发生变化的是发展趋势。智能体式流量正在快速增长,并可能在不久的将来超过互联网上传统的人类浏览流量。这迫使如今任何运营站点的人不得不重新审视。历史上,站点可以直接屏蔽中介流量,并要求用户禁用中介服务。而当大部分流量都来自智能体时,这种做法就不再奏效。一旦屏蔽不再可行,站点运营者就只剩下中介一直以来所造成的问题。站点失去了关于用户的直接信息,必须在没有这些信息的情况下决定是否信任中介。
本文讨论的是托管在用户设备以外某处的智能体。本地智能体(例如 OpenClaw)或在用户自己的浏览器、自己的设备上运行的智能体,不属于本文所讨论的主要主题范围(见下文“关于开源与本地智能体”)。
本文基于一条原则:
中介原则:无论是否存在中介,用户与站点之间的商业关系,以及各参与方的安全责任,都必须得到维护。
网站(Site)需要新的工具,来识别、服务并问责通过智能体(Agent)行事的用户,就像该用户亲自到访时一样。智能体本身以及其背后的运营方(Operator)也必须可识别、可问责,因为智能体能做到任何用户都做不到的事。智能体能够几乎无限制地扩展人类的访问规模,因此带来了新的风险,即便是此前无害的行为也不例外。
来认识一下 Ezra。Ezra 是所在城市里为人们服务的私人助理。她最重要的客户是 Amy,当地的一位 CEO,但她也为 Bob、Charlie 和 Debra 工作。她替他们跑腿:买菜、约见、办文件、订机票。Ezra 混在人群中并不起眼。
街角杂货店老板以前认识 Amy。他知道她买什么,还会把她可能喜欢的东西留出来。现在只有 Ezra 上门,带着四个人的订单,店主分不清哪些偏好是谁的。他不想把 Ezra 拒之门外,因为她给他带来很多生意。
后来 Bob 让 Ezra 给他买一部 iPhone。一周后他打电话给商店,说自己从未授权这笔扣款,却把手机留下。要想在争议中胜出,商店必须证明是 Bob 要求购买的。但商店见过的人只有 Ezra。
接着 Charlie 给 Ezra 一串密码:“我忘了自己的密码,但肯定是其中之一。”Ezra 在 Charlie 的银行耐心地逐个尝试。银行能看出正在发生攻击,但唯一能封禁的人只有 Ezra。封禁 Ezra,也就等于封禁了 Amy、Bob 和 Debra。
这些商家本身对 Ezra 并无意见。他们的问题在于,他们只能看到 Ezra,看不到她所代理的人。把 Ezra 换成 AI 智能体、把商家换成网站,就是今天的网络。
网站所有者既希望拥有足够的可见性,以便防止不良行为,又希望借此有效地变现或从自己的网站中获取价值。但正如 Ezra 的情况一样,随着 AI 智能体的介入,这种可见性大部分都消失了。下面列出了一系列网站所有者可能想要应对的操作——这些操作过去已经得到解决,但在允许智能体访问后变得更加棘手。
在上述几乎每一项挑战中,网站都承担着主要成本。这一结果源于涉及中间方时信任的运作方式。
我们的目标是构建这样一个互联网:所有用户访问网站的机会与以往相同甚至更多。在智能体出现之前,网站通常能够通过一系列技术来缓解这些风险,包括对用户设备、会话和历史记录进行指纹识别。用户仍然可以使用隐私浏览模式浏览,我们认为智能体也应该能够这样做。但如果没有额外验证,它们可能无法登录银行。
这一切都不要求智能体表现得像人,也不要求每一次操作都有真人在场。它要求的是:网站有能力获取或要求提供用户信息,以便在适用的情况下追究用户的责任——无论是否经由智能体。
一种常见的提议是,让智能体把网站的 CAPTCHA 转交给用户来解答。这只能证明当时有真人在场(即“人在回路”,HITL),仅此而已。HITL 主要是一种防止因不对齐而犯错的机制。不对齐是运营方与用户之间的问题,解决它并不能解决上文提到的大部分问题。例如,它无法把 Bob 与其他人区分开来(流量混同),也无法说明在其余时间里智能体是在为谁行事。此外,智能体的存在本就是为了消除摩擦,而 HITL 又把这种摩擦加了回来,因此运营方有动力为用户去除或绕过它。
另一种常见的提议是使用范围严格受限的访问控制。智能体的构建目标就是能做用户能做的任何事,因此实际上它们会申请并拿到做任何事的权限。一个“一切”的权限范围对网站来说毫无信息量。即便范围很窄,也只说明了该智能体被允许做什么,而没有说明智能体出错时由谁来负责——而这恰恰是网站真正需要得到答案的问题。
网络需要一些工具和协议,让网站与智能体能够协作确定允许哪些行为和动作,并把网站对智能体的偏好与策略表达出来,且这一切要以所有网站和智能体都能合理支持的方式实现。幸运的是,这些方向上的工作已经在推进,而且其中许多(即便不是全部)都可以通过应用现有标准来解决。
智能体与网站可以通过明确的协议来解决上述部分问题。例如,MOLE 是一个即将推出的方案,旨在实现无需用户特定标识符的限流,使网站能够摆脱隐式身份,转向采用明确协议来实现同样的目标。这与 x402 协议类似,后者旨在让 Web 上的支付成为可能,同时保持隐私保护。我们正在积极探索如何利用现有协议来解决其他问题,同时也在探索在现有方案不足时设计新协议。
在讨论智能体身份(Agent Identity)时,Web Bot Auth(WBA)是我们更倾向的方法。WBA 允许智能体对其请求进行签名,这为智能体提供了一种安全的自我标识方式(并隐含地标识了运营方 Operator)。我们仍需定义一种支持多个中间方的机制:当智能体 A 在浏览器 C 中使用智能体 B 时,网站需要能够知晓这一点,从而正确地确保智能体 A 的访问被正确理解并受控,例如为了防止绕过政策(Policy)。
其他类型的标识信息,例如会话、账户,甚至用户特定 ID,可能视具体场景而是必要的。我们正在与相关标准组织合作,探索传达此类标识信息的方式。
原文较长,译文为节选;译文由英文原文机器翻译,术语按行业惯例统一,可在文末展开原文核对。
查看英文原文(Agents aren’t humans (but they kinda are))
AI Agents now act on the web for millions of people. To a Site, an Agent can take many forms. It may be indistinguishable from a human user carrying out a task, or it might look like one visitor carrying many Users. This removes the ability for the Site to recognize, serve, and hold accountable the user or users behind the Agent, and causes the Site to face the costs when something goes wrong. This post argues that in order for Sites to maximize the access they provide to Agents, the ecosystem must develop new mechanisms to preserve the relationship between Sites and Users. Traditionally, in Security and Fraud Prevention, that requires three things: Identity, Reputation, and Accountability, allowing Sites to answer: Is the person acting being truthful about who they are? Is that person trustworthy? And who answers for the action?
“Personal AI Agents” (“Agents” for short) are automations that take instructions from a human (“User”) and pursue a goal by controlling a cloud computer or browser. They are usually hosted and maintained by an “Operator” as part of a managed service or consumer offering. Examples include Muse from Meta and dots from OpenAI, and more are launching all the time. Agents can potentially take any action online that their User could, without the limits that hold humans back. They don't tire, they run around the clock, they act in parallel, and they put up with friction no person would. Much of the web, from how Sites plan capacity to how they make money, assumes those limits.
Fundamentally, remotely hosted Agents are intermediaries. An intermediary is anything that sits between a User and a Site, so the Site sees it instead of the User. Agents are the newest kind of intermediary, but intermediaries have existed for a long time. Cloud browsers (hosted browsers that software controls on a User's behalf) and Proxies (services that relay a User's traffic, including VPNs) are intermediaries too. What has changed is the trajectory. Agentic traffic is growing rapidly and may eclipse traditional human browsing on the Internet in the near future. This forces a reckoning for anyone operating a Site today. Historically, a Site could simply block intermediary traffic and require Users to disable the intermediary service. That stops working when the majority of traffic is agentic. Once blocking is no longer viable, Site Operators are left with the problem that intermediaries have always created. The Site loses direct information about the User and must decide whether to trust the intermediary without it.
This post covers Agents hosted somewhere other than the User's device. Local agents (e.g. OpenClaw) or Agents running in the User's own browser, on their own device, are out of scope of the primary topic addressed by this post (see below, "On open source and local Agents").
This post rests on one principle:
The Intermediation Principle: The business relationship between Users and Sites, and each participant’s security responsibilities, must be upheld regardless of intermediation.
A Site needs new tools to recognize, serve, and hold accountable a User acting through an Agent just as it could if that User had visited directly. The Agent, and the Operator behind it, must be recognizable and accountable too, because an Agent can do what no User could. Agents are able to scale human access almost without limit, so they create new risks, even for behavior that was previously benign.
The intermediary problem
Meet Ezra. Ezra works as a personal assistant for people in her city. Her best client is Amy, a local CEO, but she also works for Bob, Charlie, and Debra. She runs their errands: groceries, appointments, paperwork, and flights. Ezra blends into the crowd.
The corner grocer used to know Amy. He knew what she bought and set aside what he thought she'd like. Now only Ezra comes in, carrying orders for four people, and the grocer can't tell whose preferences are whose. He doesn't want to turn Ezra away, because she brings him a lot of business.
Then Bob asks Ezra to buy him an iPhone. A week later he calls the store, says he never authorized the charge, and keeps the phone. To win the dispute, the store has to prove Bob asked for it. But the only person the store ever saw was Ezra.
Then Charlie gives Ezra a list of passwords: "I forgot mine, but it's one of these." Ezra patiently tries each one at Charlie's bank. The bank can see an attack happening, but the only person it can ban is Ezra. Banning Ezra also bans Amy, Bob, and Debra.
None of these business owners has a problem with Ezra herself. Their problem is that they can only see Ezra, not the person she's acting for. Swap Ezra for an AI Agent and the businesses for websites, and you have the web today.
A website owner wants sufficient visibility both to prevent bad behavior and to effectively monetize or get value from their Site. But as with Ezra, much of that visibility goes away with AI Agents. Below is a list of actions that a website owner might want to address that were previously solved, but are made more challenging by allowing Agents.
In nearly every challenge above, the Site bears the primary cost. That outcome follows from how trust works when an intermediary is involved.
Our vision
Our aim is an Internet where all Users have equal or greater access to websites than they had before. Before Agents, a Site was typically able to mitigate these risks with a collection of techniques, including fingerprinting the User’s device, session, and history. Users could still browse using private browsing mode, and we believe Agents should be able to do that as well. But they probably won’t be able to log in to a bank without additional verification.
None of this requires an Agent to act like a human or a human to be present for every action. It requires that Sites have the means to obtain or require information about the User to hold them accountable, when applicable, with or without an Agent.
What people have tried, and why they fall short
A common proposal is for Agents to pass a Site's CAPTCHA through to the User to solve. That proves some human is present at that moment (“human in the loop”, or HITL), and nothing more. HITL is primarily a mechanism to prevent mistakes from misalignment. Misalignment is an issue between the Operator and the User, and resolving it does not resolve the majority of the problems above. For example, it can't tell Bob from anyone else (Traffic commingling), and it says nothing about who the Agent acts for the rest of the time. Additionally, Agents exist to remove friction, and HITL adds back that friction, so Operators are incentivized to remove or bypass it for the User.
Another common proposal is to use tightly scoped access controls. Agents are built to do anything a User could, so in practice they ask for, and get, permission to do everything. A scope of "everything" tells the Site nothing. And even a narrow scope only says what the Agent was allowed to do. It doesn't say who answers when the Agent gets it wrong, which is the question the Site actually needs answered.
What the web needs
The web needs tools and protocols that allow Sites and Agents to collaborate to determine what behaviors and actions are allowed, as well as express preferences and policies from Sites to Agents, all in a way that can be reasonably supported by all Sites and Agents. Fortunately, work is already underway along all of these fronts, and many, if not all, of these can be addressed by applying existing standards.
Protocols
Agents and Sites can engage in explicit protocols for solving some of the problems above. For instance, MOLE is one upcoming approach that aims for rate limiting without User-specific identifiers, allowing Sites to transition away from implicit identities and towards explicit protocols for accomplishing the same goal. This is similar to the x402 protocol, which aims to enable payments on the web while remaining privacy-preserving. We are actively exploring ways in which we can leverage existing protocols for addressing other problems, as well as exploring designing new protocols when existing solutions fall short.
Identities
When discussing Agent Identity, Web Bot Auth (WBA) is our preferred method. WBA allows an Agent to sign its requests, which provides a secure way for an Agent to identify itself (and, implicitly, the Operator). We must still define a mechanism that supports multiple intermediaries: when Agent A uses Agent B inside Browser C, the Site needs to be able to know this, so that the Site can correctly ensure that access by Agent A is correctly understood and controlled, for example, in order to prevent Policy circumvention.
Other types of identifying information, such as session, account, or even User-specific IDs, might be necessary, depending on the context. We are working with the relevant standards to explore ways to communicate such identifying information.
Let’s take a look into types of Identity in regards to a User. Ultimately, Identity is a spectrum that trades various degrees of information about a user, while ideally practicing principles of data minimization. Identity provides us a mechanism to answer “who are you?” in pursuit of answering the follow-up questions of: “are you who you say you are?” and “can we trust you?”.
In many cases, identifying information isn’t needed, and privacy-preserving methods for moderating access to agents, such as through Privacy Pass and MOLE, can help us answer “can we trust you?” without needing to answer “who are you?”. Private Access Tokens was one early way in which we tried to establish trust without identifying the user, and MOLE is intended to be the successor to this technology. However, there are cases where graduated forms of disclosure along this spectrum would be needed, and you can generally characterize them in the following ways:
- Nothing - Users may act on the internet while bringing no identifiers to the table.
- Session - Sites require some way of linking requests in the same session to a single agent. This allows the Site to establish reputation for a given session and act on it accordingly. For example, Poppy has a notion of a session ID for exactly this purpose.
- Account - Sites require a way of attributing requests to the same User across sessions. This might be a stable identifier assigned by an Operator or third party to a User that persists across the account with the Operator, such as a single Agent visiting the same Site every day using the same identifier. An example use case this would enable is: “Bind your Site account to your Agent account”.
- Unique - Some Sites might require a unique, per-User identifier provisioned by a third party that persists across Operators, accounts, Agents, and sessions. This may be useful for high risk actions, or for Sites that need to provide limited access to an expensive resource or that have very restrictive obligations or compliance requirements. Government IDs, third party identity verification, and decentralized technologies like Proof of Human are all examples of technologies that can provide this.
Ultimately, Sites determine what information they need for clients to answer “is the entity behind this request allowed to do this action at this time?” In many cases, protocols already exist, or are being developed, to convey this information: WBA for conveying an Agent’s platform identity, MOLE for conveying User reputation, OAuth for conveying account identities, and so on.
Claims
Beyond identities, some actions require a fact about the real person, such as being over 18 or being the cardholder (Identity verification breaks, Friendly fraud). Often the Operator verified this at sign-up or a third party already has this information.
In order to allow Agents access to Sites or actions with these kinds of restrictions, we need mechanisms for Sites to request this information, and for Operators or third parties to provide this information.
Site Agent access policy
Today, an Agent infers a Site’s rules by trying something and interpreting the Site response (usually, whether it gets blocked). That wastes resources on both sides, and in some cases makes honest Agents appear to be malicious. Robots.txt says where a crawler may go, but isn’t fully suited to express what Agents may do.
Sites need a machine-readable way to publish what actions Agents are allowed to do. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is actively working on some preference expression mechanisms for this, primarily in the AI Preferences Working Group. However, the focus of the group is on expressing preferences for use (such as training, inference, and search), and there is still not a group focused on the larger need for preference expression mechanisms discussed here.
On open source and local Agents
Agents that are not run as an “Intermediary” (e.g. on-device Agents, or locally hosted Agents such as OpenClaw) raise different concerns. Primarily, they look like (and are) automation, and they have no single party to build reputation or hold accountability with.
There are many solutions to this, one of which is to ask these Agents to provide a Unique ID. However, addressing this is not the initial focus of Trusted Agent Delegation.
What’s next
Real-world solutions to the problems that Sites face won’t emerge from fragmented, vendor-specific mechanisms. They require open, interoperable standards that are rooted in real world experience. We have been, and continue to actively collaborate across the ecosystem, with major Operators, identity verification companies, payment providers, merchants, publishers, proxy providers, and cloud browsing companies, to align operational requirements directly with active work on these problems in the IETF and elsewhere
Our focus is on bridging the gap between running code and emerging specifications across working groups and activities like Web Bot Auth, AIPREFs, OAuth, WIMSE, and MOLE. We are doing this, in part, by co-authoring and refining open protocols like WBA and MOLE and building and deploying implementations of these protocols at scale.
We are also announcing the Trusted Agent Delegation (TAD) coalition. The goal of TAD is to bring a group of representatives across the ecosystem to have discussions on the overall problem set that was put forth in this document, examine all existing protocols, and then to bring more well-defined problems or problems to the IETF to work through, as needed. We intend to hold side meetings at the IETF and workshops in the future to facilitate discussion.
If you are building agents, agent runtimes, running an edge or cloud platform, or managing commercial or compliance applications or infrastructure, we need you to get involved in these efforts too. Check out this page for more information on how to participate.
What you can do today
An open, interoperable foundation is where we're headed, starting with TAD. But you don't have to wait for new protocols to start regaining visibility and control. As of this week, Cloudflare customers can take three concrete steps:
See which Agents are on your site, and what they're doing. Security Analytics now breaks out Personal Assistants as their own traffic category, and a new widget lists every Agent visiting your site, how many requests each one sends, the paths it hits, and the errors it runs into. Unexplained automated traffic becomes traffic you can reason about. And for the broader picture of AI crawlers and bots affect your business, including how much each Operator crawls versus the traffic it sends back, Enterprise Bot Management customers can use Business Insights.
Set access on your terms, per Agent. Using AI Crawler and Agent access policies, you can welcome the Agents that bring you business and restrict the ones that don't — allow an Agent across your site, block it only on pages with ads, or block it entirely. Your Search and Training policies stay independent.
Tie an Agent back to the user it acts for — and act on it. For sites using Account Abuse Protection (early access), every login and sign-up now shows whether a personal Agent made the request, and which one. When an attacker abuses a shared Agent on one account, you can mitigate that account — with a WAF rule on its Hashed User ID — without blocking the Agent for every other legitimate user behind it. This is a first, concrete answer to the Traffic commingling challenge described above: you can finally see past the Agent to the User, and respond accordingly.
These are the first building blocks of the vision, already in production. More will follow as the standards mature.
And if your company has a more restrictive position on Agents, we would love to hear it. Reach out and share your problems with us directly. We are looking to help build an Internet where site owners have visibility and control, but also where Agents have the maximum access that is reasonable within those controls. You can reach out to your Customer Support team, or email us at crawlercontrols@cloudflare.com.
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原文发布于 Cloudflare Blog(Agents aren’t humans (but they kinda are)),标题、摘要与正文由机器翻译,术语按行业惯例统一,未经人工逐句校订。